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THE NEW THEORY OF CRIME AND JUSTICE.[1]

PART I.—CRIME AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON.

INTRODUCTION.

THE name of Cesare Lombroso has, during these last ten or twelve years, been frequently repeated, now with commendation vehement and again with disapproval no less hearty, by jurists, legislators, ecclesiastics and philosophers, as that of a man who was bent upon bringing to pass a change in our estimate, and therefore a revolution in our treatment, of crime and the criminal. Nor has Lombroso drawn back from this account of himself; nay, he glories in it. "A revolution?" he would seem to answer, "why should there not be a revolution in our philosophy of crime, now that we have arrived at an essentially new method of regarding society as a whole? The modern man is a disciple of M. Comte or of Herbert Spencer. He is nothing if not inductive and scientific. He no longer puts his trust in

1 Cesare Lombroso: "L'Uomo Delinquente, in rapporto all Antropologia, alla Giurisprudenza ed alla Psichiatria." Volumi I., II., III. Pp. xxxi., 652, 576, 677. Con. Atlante. 5a Editione. Torino, 1897.

metaphysical systems, woven of moon beams and hypothesis. He has discarded theology and broken with religion. He is secular and secularist in every sense of the word. To him there is only one order of existence conceivable—the present—which is altogether made up of phenomena nor has any transcendental elements. If, then, he contemplates all other details of the social organism under this 'positive' aspect, how can he exclude from its range, or leave to the old metaphysicians, divines, and civilians, that particular set of energies, real, but misdirected, which have been hitherto known as crimes? Are they not factors in the world of human activities? Let them, if such they be, receive the due of all factors. They must have laws and conditions of their own—their averages, periods and latitudes in the moral universe, their causes and consequences, their flourishing seasons and times of decay. Crime, in short, is a branch of psycho-physics; and it requires to be examined into, like any other social phenomenon, like health and disease, or riches and poverty; like commerce, or trade, or finance. A revolution, therefore, if you please; but one which was inevitable, and which may prove to be a step in the direction of human progress."

THE PREVAILING MISCONCEPTIONS.

To this effect I seem to hear Signor Lombroso pleading, on his own principles, which are those of Positivism—for a new exploration into the depths and dark places where chaos opens its enormous jaws, as if to swallow down the social order. Most men are willing to pass by these dismal phenomena with averted glances, happy so long as the authorities keep them down to a certain level, or, not succeeding altogether in that design, at all events keep them out of sight. To the ordinary civilized being, crime is an accident of which he reads in his newspaper; it has no more significance than any other accident may claim; and he does not wish to pry into its laws or conditions. It is a world which lies beyond his horizon, less patent to him by far than the world of dis-

ease, or perhaps even the world of insanity; for he would not deny that by some unlucky chance he might catch typhoid fever or go out of his mind; but he cannot fancy himself ever committing an offence which would bring him to the Assizes. And when this same average citizen is set down in a jury-box, still he does not change his point of view; he gives his verdict according to the evidence (we will suppose), but still without philosophizing; and he eats his dinner afterwards with a tranquil mind, and forgets the culprit whom he and his eleven neighbors have found guilty, and have sent to penal servitude or the scaffold.

Nor is the barrister that accuses or defends much more inquisitive, as a rule, than the juryman whom he addresses at such a wearisome length. In his eyes, also, crime is the chance occurrence which enables him to make a speech and his livelihood. Trained up in the law, he is seldom a philosopher. Once in a way some ardent loving soul, such as the late Montaguh Williams, cannot dismiss the matter from his thoughts when the Court has risen; he endeavors to trace the condemned man back to where he came from, or onward to the place whither he is to be sent. But these are exceptions. And as the judge is taken from Bar to Bench, we cannot be surprised if he, too, for all his sense of duty, is content to administer the law as he finds it, without searching into its origin, or measuring its effects, or asking society how it comes about that he is ever passing sentence—at least up to 40 or 50 per cent.—on the same criminals. It would be interesting to learn whether prison-reform, in any single instance, has been due to the efforts, or is assignable to the teaching, of judge, jury, or legal practitioners, since the days of Howard to this moment in which I am writing. Be that as it may, the general statement is not open to question that law, as such, concerns itself hardly at all with the genesis of crime; by law it is taken as a subject matter in existence, as a datum on which to proceed. What is meant by a criminal in distinction from a non-criminal, except that one has been convicted of breaking the law, and the other has not been convicted, our courts seem never to have asked. There

is infinite description, indeed, of high crimes, misdemeanors, felonies, and the rest; occasional talk about responsibility, and outside the precincts of the legal enclosure discussion, now and then, as to the ends of punishment. But the *corpus delicti* which is the criminal himself escapes observation. He is taken for granted. As yet there has been no science of the delinquent, or investigation into the causes that bring him forth.

A CHANGE OF METHOD JUSTIFIED.

Hence, perhaps, the confusion admittedly reigning on a subject of the utmost importance to mankind. "In no two countries," observes Mr. Morrison, Chaplain of Wandsworth Gaol, "is the criminal law exactly the same; in no two countries is crime classified in the same way; in no two countries is the criminal law administered in the same spirit; or regarded in the same light by the population." That there should be marked divergencies in establishing what I may denominate the scale of crime, so far as popular opinion is concerned, will not be surprising; but that legislation should be so much a matter of guesswork; and the criminal class have been only of late years, and in a small proportion, submitted to the tests and the observations of science; this undoubtedly shows the disadvantage attendant upon a mere abstract, forensic, and disconnected method of reviewing social phenomena. The change which Lombroso advocates is, therefore, abundantly justified, so far as it proposes to substitute a clear and definite inquiry into the nature of the criminal, for theoretic psychology and mere tradition.

FROM THE OBJECT TO THE SUBJECT OF CRIME.

It is a change from the study of the object, to examination of the subject. It does not inquire, in the first place, what this man has done, but what he is. It proceeds from the individual to his acts, instead of treating "De actibus humanis in genere." It is concerned with his physical

structure, his height and weight, his brain, his countenance, his hands and feet; with his emotions and habits; with the language he employs and the companions he frequents; with his writing, his singular tattoo marks, his favorite literature, his arts and crafts, his standing in society, and with the confessions which he sometimes, or often, or seldom makes. It goes back to his pedigree on both sides; it draws up, so far as attainable, the *dossier*, or "human documents," of his kinsfolk to the fourth and fifth generation; it studies him, in short, as a product of heredity, and as a person who is *solidaire*, as the French would say, of his whole tribe. Darwin has expatiated on the descent of man; Lombroso would relate, even if unable to account for, the descent of the criminal. And when he had thus analyzed and summed him up positively, next he would submit his delinquent to the method of comparison. He would set him between *homo sanus* and *homo insanus*, and note the resemblances and differences. To Lombroso the criminal is a species or kind of his own—a class which must needs have its characteristic marks, physical, mental, moral and social. These, when brought home and distilled, as it were, into the proper formulæ, will give his definition—not, however, an abstract statement which can be fitted upon every one who falls under the dominion of the law; but a practical guiding rule, to be applied only by examining on recognized principles and by methods which allow of improvement, each individual as he comes up for trial.

FREE WILL, DETERMINISM AND M. TAINE.

But precisely at this stage, an objection which the reader has, I dare say, been disposed to entertain from the beginning, will demand consideration. "How," it may be asked, "is all this minute examination of structure, physique, and temperament, as if bearing on the question of crime and guiltiness, compatible with belief in man's moral freedom? Crime is an offence against law; it implies deliberation, or 'malice aforethought,' and carries with it responsibility. What have

these things to do with the shape of the criminal's head, or the setting of his ears? Will it be contended that some men, or that any, are criminals born, doomed by nature to violate the ordinances of society, and unable to resist temptation? If so, what becomes of their responsibility? Or can we pretend, in the name of justice, to punish them for actions which they were never free to omit? Is it not, as Edmund says in 'King Lear,' the 'excellent foppery of the world which makes guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, and stars, as if we were villains on necessity; fools by heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers, by an enforced obedience of planetary influence; and all that we are evil in by a divine thrusting-on?" Such is the alarm taken at a method which would seem to deny in the criminal any power of restraining his murderous or cheating instincts. And Lombroso, in fact, does not hesitate to abolish free-will. Though extremely unlearned in all that concerns metaphysics, he is, emphatically, a necessarian; so much so, indeed, that I think it may save time and obviate later discussion, if I set down here a translation of M. Taine's remarkable creed as to the nature of the human mortal, in which, beyond a doubt, Lombroso would acquiesce. M. Taine writes as follows in his treatise *De L'Intelligence:* "With the help of these examples, we may form an idea of our mental mechanism. We must put aside words like 'reason,' 'intelligence,' 'will,' or 'personal power,' nay, even the word 'ego,' as we put aside 'vital force,' 'medicative force,' 'vegetative soul.' These are literary metaphors, useful at the most as brief and summary expressions to denote general states and converging effects. What does the observer see, as a physiologist, in the living system? He sees that there are *cells* of divers sorts, capable of spontaneous development, and modified in the path of that development by the concurrence or the antagonism of neighboring cells. What, again, does the observer see, as a psychologist, in the thinking subject? He sees that, over and above sensations, there are *images* of divers sorts, primitive or subsequent, endowed with certain

tendencies, and modified in their development by the concurrence or the antagonism of other images simultaneous or adjacent. As the living body is a polypus of cells depending on one another, so is the mind a polypus of images depending on one another; and the unity resulting is, in every case, a harmony and an effect.[1] Everyone of these images has a force peculiar to itself, and tends spontaneously to a state which would be hallucination, false memory, and other illusions of madness. But it is resisted by another sensation, or image, or group of images. . . . And that equilibrium is what we know as the condition of waking reason. Whenever it has been overthrown by the excess or defect of one of its elements, we become either wholly or partially insane."[2]

MECHANIC THEORIES.

I would beg the student to keep this luminous declaration before him. Short as it seems, it will furnish a key to the arrangement and drift of Lombroso's two thousand pages. It must be understood in an exclusive sense, as denying that the individual, so-called, the mental and physical "polypus," who is only an "ego" metaphorically speaking, has any power to choose between the images which present themselves, or can direct the cellular movements of which he is victim. All, at last, is mechanism, and wheels acting within wheels, now to produce the results that we name virtue, and now their opposite,—vice, or crime, or folly, according to its kind. Free will does simply not exist, on this showing. And such is one extreme, whereby man sinks down to an automaton moved by springs within himself, over which he has no control.

THIS A REACTION FROM DESCARTES.

Every Catholic is aware that a doctrine so unphilosophical and pernicious runs counter to the definitions of our faith. Perhaps, however, not so many have been led to observe

1 *I. e.*, not a cause.

2 De l'Intelligence I, p. 123-4.

that, in this modern form, it is a recoil and a reaction against another extreme, certainly false, and, as experience has shown, not more favorable to our philosophy,—I mean the system of Descartes. That system has wrought immeasurable disaster, not only in the schools of metaphysicians but upon the public mind. For by its misconception of the unity which exists between spirit and matter in our organism, it has opened a yawning gulf which still seems to divide observant science from traditional religion. Confining myself to the question in hand, I remark that on Cartesian principles man, strictly speaking, is said to be "an intelligence served by organs"; he is like a bird in a cage, or, as Plato described him, like an oarsman in a boat,—himself independent and utterly alien from the mere habitat which is his body, and the instruments which he employs to do his will. It follows that he must exercise the same unlimited freedom in governing his sensations, his motions, and his bodily activities, that he exercises when dealing with the world outside. His freedom is not relative but absolute, not within limits and under circumstances, but infinite and universal. Such, too, is the popular notion of man's liberty; a sharp line is drawn separating the insane from the normal, without degrees of shading, or allowance for intermediate twilight regions, or taking into account the experience of doctors, priests, or attendants on the sick, who know, for they have seen it with their own eyes, that self-control and freedom of the will, though most assured realities, are liable to endless modifications, and in each individual have a determined character. But while the multitude and the Cartesian agree in dressing up this abstract phantom, this mere *ens rationis*, and assigning to it attributes which the concrete man does not possess, our Catholic schools, following the lead of Aristotle, decline to argue about the spirit as if it were a *substantia separata*. They have always upheld the teaching of common sense and every-day experience, which, in technical language, amounts to this, that the living man is one composite substance, a being at unity with itself, and one principle of action,—in brief, "anima est forma corporis substantialis." In this manner

it is allowable or rather necessary to insist on the conditioned, relative, and finite terms within which any one of us puts forth even his highest spiritual energies. There must be physical antecedents;—sensations, images, and groups of images,—before we can exercise our deliberate choice, or attempt the virtue of self-control. Thus much we grant to M. Taine and his disciples. But, on the other hand, some power of self-control we do possess, enough, indeed, to constitute the average man a moral being, who must answer to the law as to his own conscience for what he does. We hold, therefore, a middle course between these two extremes, neither agreeing with Descartes when he seems to make of the spirit a pure intelligence living its own life within but apart from the organism, nor refusing with the mere phenomenist to recognize a sovereignty,—constitutional, but not despotic, as Aristotle would say,—in virtue of which the "ego" has power to inhibit or to grant the solicitations of its various faculties. But within limits, we say again; else there is no possibility of comprehending how the normal state of sleep, and the abnormal state of insanity, do, as we see, suspend for a time, or utterly take away, the exercise of choice and discretion in our acts.

WE ARE FREE, BUT LIMITED.

Had Lombroso given ear to the Catholic principles, and looked into that chapter "De Actibus Humanis" which illustrates them, he need never have taken on himself the superfluous burden of a theory as detestable as it is inconsistent. For, to quote the grave Bishop Butler, "it is to be observed that this Necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, and to certain ends: because all this is matter of undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment, be conscious of." And therefore, "though it were admitted that this opinion of Necessity were speculatively true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole of our

present life. For the constitution of the present world, and the condition in which we are actually placed is as if we were free."[1]

Free, indeed, we are, but under circumstances, as a painter is free to design, and to fill his canvas with, figures or landscapes according to his choice; yet he will paint in one characteristic style and not in another; he will be dependent on training as well as genius; nor can he dispense with colors and camel's hair brushes, or call up his inward vision and fix it on the passing wind. He is limited in every way but one, for it remains in his power to leave the canvas a white untinctured surface as he found it. Now we shall not be calling this power in question if we examine what sort of picture he would paint, supposing that he painted at all. Moreover, schools of painting exist in which, while we cannot pretend that everyone who comes out of them will keep the manner he learnt therein, yet similarity enough is sure to be preserved, so that we can fairly speak of that tradition as a real thing, and pass judgment accordingly.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAW-BREAKING.

Hence, although we insist on free will as essential both to human nature in its ordinary adult condition, and to the idea of morality, we shall be prepared to listen when evidence is brought, first, to prove that crime is subject to averages or statistics (and thus, in one form or other, falls under the conception of social law), and again, that there is a type, a class of men and women, whose predispositions lay them open beyond their fellows to the solicitations, physical or psychical, upon which crime follows. There may be zones of delinquency, and delinquents born. It is a question of fact which cannot receive a solution prior to experience. What experience, then, have we to go upon? Lombroso begins with a dissection of the individual. But by way of entering more easily into a difficult and debated subject, I prefer to glance abroad and to touch upon the great masses

1 Analogy, Part I., ch. 6.

of shade lying over Europe which, by their very distribution, point to some regular sources of criminality. Not all crimes are committed in all places, nor by all professions, nor in every class, nor equally throughout the year; nations and countries have their particular offences, as they have a weather and a climate of their own; and when we open the atlas, or chart, which Ferri has with infinite pains drawn up for our inspection, and which Lombroso copies, we perceive, after a little study, how strangely defined and almost palpable its evidence may be.

HOMICIDE.

These maps are a painful but conclusive argument. Were crime the chance-medley which law and popular prejudice concur in supposing, it would be impossible to construct its geographical distribution upon a scheme, or to divide into well-marked provinces the categories under which it falls. What are the facts, however? Both in space and time it is amenable to system. If we begin with homicide, for example, we find that in a given series of years, while it varied from 5 to 8 per million in Great Britain, it amounted to 14–17 in France, to 23–26 in Austria, to 74–77 in Spain; and that in Italy it reached the enormous proportion of 95 to 98, between 15 and 20 times the number in Britain. But if we fasten upon Italy alone, all does not exhibit a uniform depth of shadow. Simple homicide falling below 60 in the million lessens that shadow over the whole of Lombardy and Venice; while it grows in Tuscany to 120; reaches in certain districts of the old Neapolitan kingdom 180; and in Reggio and on the southern Sicilian coast exceeds the appalling number of 240. Turn to France. In the Celtic West, homicide is rare, less than 3 per million; among the Ligurians of the Mediterranean Riviera, it becomes more than 10; in Corsica it reaches 200. In Spain we may travel along a broad irregular track, beginning at the Central Pyrenees, narrowing considerably some hundred miles further down, then leaping out until it stretches to the sea,

and at last blackening the entire breadth of the land as if with a sable scarf, and everywhere within these clear but varying limits yielding over 150 homicides to the million. Manifestly, some influence which plays havoc with the law forbidding murder prevails, as if it were a pestilence, in Sicily and the south of Spain. Is it race, or climate, or lack of education or economic distress, or bad government? That is the problem to be investigated; and we have taken a step towards the solution when we recognize the geographical figure of the crime.

CENTRES OF DELINQUENCY.

But we may apply the same test by inquiring whether all sorts of delinquencies reach a similar height where homicide is rampant; or again, whether every kind of homicide prevails in a given area. Then we perceive that areas always exist; but that each has its offences peculiar to itself. As again, in Italy, the crime called vendetta is many times more frequent in Romagna on the Adriatic, and in Reggio which looks towards the Tuscan Sea, than anywhere else in the Peninsula. Assassination ravages Sicily and Sardinia, but is absent, comparatively speaking, from Lombardo-Venetia. Theft, also, has its proper domain, so curiously varying that the chart is a conglomerate of black and white patches, like a counterpane; but observe, they are always patches, not a sprinkling of individuals at random. Even more minute specifications hold good; the use of unlawful weapons, of poison, or drowning, as means of homicide, can be mapped out; and according as we put the question, our chart moves its shadows up and down, sometimes cutting as with an instrument one distinct portion of the country from all the rest, and exhibiting its shape as in alto-relievo. Some striking instances may be given.

"In all regions of Italy, and almost in every province," says Lombroso, "villages are pointed out as having furnished an unbroken series of delinquents in a special kind. Thus, in Liguria, Lerici is celebrated for its cheating; Campo-

freddo and Masson for homicide, and Pozzolo for highway robbery; in the Lucca district, Campanori has its assassins; in Piedmont, Cardé has its rural thieves; . . . so too, Pergola near Pistoja, insomuch that 'thief' and 'Pergolese' are all one . . . Sant' Andrea and Ferreto are well known for the men being addicted to homicide and the women to petty defalcations. And in southern Italy, down to 1860, Lora, Melfi and S. Fele were nests of brigands, as, in Sicily, Partinico and Monreale." This prevalence of special crimes on one spot is due, adds Lombroso, to the qualities of the race which dwells there. It is matter of history that Pergola was settled by gypsies, Masson by Portuguese homicides, and Campofreddo by pirates from Corsica, whence this last neighborhood preserves in its dialect fragments of the Corsican and Genoese.[1]

But the village of Artena in the Roman territory holds undisputed its bad pre-eminence, dating as far back as 1155. The proportion of woundings, murders and assassinations is six times larger than in the rest of Central Italy; for open assault it is even thirty times as much. And if theft reaches the measure of 47 per hundred thousand elsewhere, in Artena it comes up to 177. Meanwhile, since 1852, according to Sighele, the names of the culprits always have been the same, —father, son and grandson carrying on the immemorial tradition. For in 1557 Paul IV., that stern Caraffa, had put to the ban all its inhabitants, giving license to any one who would to slay them and lay waste the village, "that henceforth it might no longer be the nest and shelter of infamous robbers." Unhappily, the Artenesi seem to have escaped their doom.

Sicily deserves, and would richly reward, the most ample investigation from a criminal point of view. It has a wealth of terms signifying murder, conspiracy and the "evil life," —the *Mala Vita.* In common Italian *malandrino* signifies a ruffian; but in Sicilian merely a man "whose blood is warm within him," as Gratiano says. Of late years, New

1 Lombroso, iii., 24 seq.

Orleans has taught Americans the precise meaning of the words *maffia* and *camorra*. In Sicily they are ancient, and have always been well understood. Now the head and front of *malandrinaggio* is in a single valley, the Conca d'Oro, or Golden Shell; and there, says Prof. Crudeli, the Berber and Semite clans from the opposite coast of Africa settled down, time out of mind. Its inhabitants still wear the Arab features; they are "sober, patient, hospitable, secret, shy, cunning, superstitious, proud, vindictive and bloodthirsty." In other words, they have brought from the desert and the burning South a character which is utterly different, as the statistics prove, from that of their Aryan neighbors in Messina and Catania. Is, then, crime an accident in these *malandrini?*

The tables which I am regretfully compelled to pass over show, as already hinted, a marked variety within Italian limits; simple homicide falls to 27 per million in Emilia; ascends in Umbria, which is no great distance away, to 102; in Calabria springs up to 246; and tops the record in Molise with 286. First in the ranks of crime march Semites and Latins, next Germans, then Celts, and last of all the Slav populations round about the Venetian border. And significant surely it is that, in the murderous districts of the South, spots like Beneventum and Salerno have a comparatively peaceful story to tell, with marked falling off in the list of serious offences. Now these people are Norman by descent, tall and fair, with blue eyes, reminding the student of Robert Guiscard and mediæval rovers who first assailed St. Gregory VII., and when they had taken him prisoner knelt for his blessing. Centuries upon centuries have passed away; but the Norman blood keeps cool, and assassination is not among its instincts.

RACE AND CRIME IN EUROPE.

Summing up with Ferri, it appears that all over Europe the demarcations of race in criminality lie as follows: The Latins are at the bad extreme as regards murder in every form, but especially with violence, and also as regards infanticide,—deeds of cruelty; while the Teutons are at the

good extreme. But, on the other hand, Teutons and not Latins are prone to suicide and subject to insanity,—their want of equilibrium turns against themselves. Or to anticipate the conclusions at which by and by we shall see Lombroso arriving, the crimes of Northern races indicate greater intelligence, an advanced civilization, large urban centres, and, if we describe these things under the name of progress, a further stage in development. Thus they would be crimes attending on evolution as its shadow, and all issuing forth as the consequence of an over-excited brain. But Latin crimes would be atavistic, the outcome not of development but of arrest and relapse; we might describe them as survivals not of the fittest; as maladaptations to the modern *régime*; as primitive, or mediæval, or barbarous; and the outward signs of a lack of sensibility accompanied with loss, or absence, of self-control. The high-water mark is reached when, in Naples or Palermo, societies which have murder for their object flourish not only during seasons of political excitement, but from age to age; when public opinion screens the assassin, juries absolve him, and a criminal rate fifty times that of England excites no indignation and rouses no attempt at reform. "The weakness of Italy," said Ferrero, an exceedingly acute philosopher, "is in the knees and the feet." But none of those who live in the South regard that weakness; for it has ever been so. We conclude, therefore, perhaps in spite of ourselves, from these examples, to the influence of race upon crime as direct, permanent, and capable of reduction to diagrams and figures. Speaking broadly, it is not too much to affirm that every people has in its blood a law of predisposition, varying indefinitely of course from individual to individual, but still a law or a tendency, which governs the statistics of evil doing. If there is variation enough to demonstrate some power of resistance,—free-will, as we maintain,—there is also regularity enough to show the presence of motives which in this proportion are not resisted. Or will any other explanation meet the evidence, a few samples of which are now briefly indicated? For my part, I know of none.

THE CALENDAR OF CRIMINALS.

We take a second step in advance. Areas of crime do exist; but is such a thing conceivable as a calendar, an almanac, of crime? It used to be a French saying that in the month of November Englishmen hang and drown themselves. On consulting the tables, we find that November is too cold and foggy, in the judgment of Englishmen, for attempts of this kind—June, July, August, are the suicidal months. But, in any case, the seasons which exhibit a high percentage, whether of delinquencies against the person, or assaults on property, can be distinguished in all countries where a record is kept. The height of summer brings evil passions to a maximum; spring is more favorable to them than the late autumn; and in the depth of winter, except for house-breaking and other enterprises that covet long nights, it would seem as if energy were blunted for ill-doing as for the noblest undertakings of genius. Season, climate, latitude furnish or deny opportunities; in the frozen North, war, rebellions and heroic poetry are alike wanting; no free popular government has ever been established within the tropics; and Lombroso might have remarked on the moral degeneration which attacks like a disease, and too often conquers, such Europeans as have been entrusted with the government of inferior tribes, or have long had dealings with them, and have drunk in their pestilential air.

Another parallel, which is, at the same time, a corroboration, may be drawn from the increase in violence and disorder among convicts at certain turning points of the year, as in June, July and September; while a corresponding decrease has been observed in November and February. And the like is known to occur in asylums, which have their good and bad days, their times of outbreak, and, as one may term it, their weather chart, depending on variations in heat, cold and moisture, on the prevalent winds, and, according to new science as well as old superstition, on the age of the moon. Yet all these influences are liable to be overcome by causes which have a more human aspect, by political or economic

disturbance or prosperity, and, as is evident, by moral discipline.[1]

TRADES AND PROFESSIONS.

In all professions, the most kindly or the most sacred, a measurable quota of evil doers may be found. Taking the Italian statistics again, it would appear that the number of such persons is largest among "day-laborers, domestic servants and operatives,"—a miscellaneous catalogue—being 1 in 183 of all who are found guilty; next, but at a long interval, come the so-called "liberal professions," 1 in 345; then the agricultural classes, 1 in 419; almost on a par with these stand the civil and military *impiegati*, 1 in 428; and far in moral advance of all, the clergy, who contribute to this black list only 1 in 1,047. It is impossible not to stay for a moment and emphasize a testimony, so clear and beyond suspicion, to the much calumniated, despoiled and persecuted order of the Italian priesthood, which, under the new reign of liberalism and freemasonry, has seldom been allowed the common rights of citizens. Whatever, then, may be concluded as touching the present state of things in southern Italy, from the numbers we have given, they do not reflect upon the clergy themselves. Instead of saying, "like pastor, like people," we feel tempted to exclaim, "Nation unworthy of such pastors, rebellious and recalcitrant!" But the inferences which are suggested by this general view, and confirmed in detail as we go down the various trades and modes of life, will occupy our attention later. The French assizes report a like gradation. Though agriculture employs 53 per cent. of the population, it furnishes only 32 per cent. to crime in all its classes. The highest numbers come, as we might anticipate, from those who have no professions—vagrants, beggars, and so forth; or who make their pretended business a cover behind which they exercise their only real trade, the commission, or the preparation and concealment of penal offences. It is worth observing that crimes

1 L. iii., 9.

against property are charged in an extraordinary proportion against "procurators, notaries, ushers and advocates,"—persons in whom familiar acquaintance with law and law-courts has not been able to overcome the spirit of lawless plundering. The military state is responsible, among Germans, it would seem, for much violence and disorder; but in Italy and France it does not go beyond the average, a fact, says Lombroso, as regards his own people, of which Italians may be justly proud. By all means; but we ought not to overlook what he has proved so abundantly, that the rate of misdemeanors among his countrymen will allow of a percentage in the soldier such as elsewhere not even born criminals attain. As a matter of fact, the army, like the nation, contributes to delinquency in a proportion varying with its racial elements.

This disparity of guilt in the professions is borne out by Austrian, German and English tables, as well by the American, and may be taken, therefore, as fully established.

YOUTH, THE SEASON OF LAWLESSNESS.

Our succeeding inquiry goes deeper, and will throw out many filaments in the direction of Lombroso's psychological theories, with which I hope to deal in my second article. What is the age, respectively, of the various criminals who come before a judge and are convicted? On this subject there is no room for hesitation. The official report presented by English authorities, and dealing with the year 1894, has this remarkable statement, which other evidence confirms on every side: "I noticed," says the witness, "last year that the proportion of criminals between the ages of 16 and 21 was higher than at any other age, and that from this point the proportion declined as life advanced. This year we find the proportion between 16 and 21 markedly higher than in 1893, while the diminution of the proportion as life advanced was more rapid than before. The editor of the French statistics, in commenting on the number of criminal young persons in Germany, remarks: 'All the great civilized States of Europe,

with the exception of England, must lament the same increase of juvenile criminals under 21.' I fear that this exception in favor of England has been given under a false impression." The numbers had not, in that year, gone down; but in 1895 there was a clear falling off. And "the most noteworthy features in 1894, as in 1893, are that one-fourth of the persons convicted of simple larceny are children under 16; and more than one-third of convicted burglars are youths between the ages of 16 and 21." [1]

To these data I will add immediately, for reasons to be discussed afterwards, that among European populations, taken altogether, the maximum of *crime* is attained before the age of 30; but the maximum of *insanity* between 30 and 40. The percentage of criminals in England, Italy and Austria who are from 20 to 30 years old varies only from 42 and a fraction to something over 45. During the next decennium these figures run down to 16 in England, 27 in Austria, and 28 in Italy; add another ten years, and we find the proportions to be respectively 8.40, 12.1, and 11.6 in the hundred convicts. What is the significance wrapped up in numbers so unequal? Again it must be concluded, I say, that crime is not simply an accident, since it bears a relation at once so definite and so peculiar in each of these countries to the years of their inhabitants. Thus we seem to have lighted upon the traces of a law, which invites, or rather clamorously solicits, an explanation from science and philosophy. Has the lad of 18 not yet acquired free will? Impossible. Or has the man of 40 profited by experience? In what degree is reform to be hoped from prison-discipline, the silent system, industrial schools, teaching convicts to read, write, and cypher? We stand now in the presence of the entire criminal problem; but its difficulties do not lessen. What figures can be furnished us when we ask how many of these unhappy mortals, at the various ages given, are identically the same men that began as children, with their petty larcenies, their offences against morals, or their deeds of cruelty and violence?

1 See *Quarterly Rev.*, April, 1897.

THE HABITUAL OFFENDER.

It is the great dominant question of the recidive, the habitual offender, the criminal class. In his lurid romance, "Les Misérables," Victor Hugo has canonized the innocent recidive, Jean Valjean, who is not the enemy but the victim of law and order. Lombroso would readily allow—it is a constant asseveration in his teaching—that "the prison is the school of crime"; but though Jean Valjean is much to be pitied, relapsed convicts belong, as a rule, to quite another category. Not many years ago the prison was looked upon by legislators and philanthropists in the light of a moral forcing-house; "nemo malus nisi invitus" appeared to sum up the principles on which, in theory, our new model at Pentonville or Birmingham was to be administered; the aim of punishment was reformation; the means elementary instruction in book-learning; and the result has been—failure! Education, instead of reforming the thief, the burglar, the vagabond, has taught them more subtle methods whereby to compass their ends. And the number of relapsed is greater than at any previous time. In general it may range from 30 to 55, and even to 80 per cent. "All penal statistics," we are told by Lombroso, "are unanimous in establishing the constant and growing frequency of relapse in our delinquents." Take France. The proportion in 1826 was 10 per cent.; it had reached 56 per cent. in 1886. Look at Prussia. The oscillation there between 1871 and 1877 was among the men from 77 to 80 per cent.; among the women from 74 to 84 of recidives. In Austria, the numbers vary, but may run up to 59, and in penal establishments to 74. As regards England, Mr. Morrison says that "our present methods of punishment have exceedingly little effect on a large class of offenders, and were never more inefficient for reformatory purposes than they are to-day. A conclusive proof is the steady growth of what our French friends call recidivism. At present, old offenders form a larger proportion of the prison population than they ever did before. . . . In all such cases imprisonment may be successful

in punishing the offender; but it is useless as an instrument for making him better in character, or a better member of society."[1]

THE HIGH AVERAGE OF RELAPSE.

The English figures, in 1894, bear out this contention to its full extent. There were 84,603 convicted prisoners. Of these, 23,592 had been convicted once previously; 10,790 twice; 7,629 thrice; 5,639 four times; 4,405 five times: 12,092 six to ten times; 9,659 eleven to twenty times, and 10,797 more than twenty times. Add these sums together, and they give us the astounding total, in England, mark you, reader, not in southern Spain or Italy, of 85,206 previous convictions. Now, if we take all those who have been more than ten times in prison, we get a catalogue of no less than 20,456 offenders, who form, beyond any reasonable doubt, the Old Guard of this anarchic host. *These are the criminal class.* These, and their aids, auxiliaries, recruits, commissariat and all the camp followers whom they draw after them; who are sometimes in gaol, then at liberty, but always and everywhere a social danger. And they begin young. The French tables show that of one thousand recidives, 67 were below the age of 16; 204 had not reached 21; 284 were between 21 and 30; and 215 between 30 and 40. Thus, at the mature age of 30, when a man's position in life and permanent character may be looked upon as decided, 55 per cent. of relapses had taken place, from which no hope of amendment could be fairly entertained. Moreover, when we distinguish habitual offenders into groups, it appears that the obstinate criminal belongs to the graver sort; he is a robber, house-breaker, swindler, imposter, moral maniac, hopeless drunkard, or incorrigible tramp; and if in England he is not a homicide, because hanging does not allow him a second chance, yet in Italy, where the punishment of death is no longer inflicted, he commits this crime, though in prison, or on receiving his discharge. Allowing for the high percentage of death in a class so little guarded against disease and accident, as well as for the

1 *Quarterly Review*, ubi supra.

number that escape detection, we may conclude with Tancredi, "that relapse is the rule with criminals as soon as they are free," and Lombroso declares that, in his opinion, the old offender and the born delinquent are one and the same.

THE BORN DELINQUENT.

However that may be, since we have ascertained the existence of a true species, or fixed description, of lawless human creature, who starts at an early age on the career of crime, pursues it, although frequently imprisoned, turns his very education to bad account, and is irreclaimable, the question arises whether he was born or made, or perhaps both the one and the other. We might ask such a question with regard to any widespread social phenomena—as, for instance, how many die in the British Islands of consumption and its allied forms, and whether all have inherited the disease, or in what way they have become liable to it. And we should find a certain number who had it in them from their birth; some, also, who had taken it, though previously sound and free from its symptoms; and among these latter, the causes which laid them open to its ravages would be moral as well as physical, and, in the long run, might turn out to be economic. But the class of hereditary consumptives would present to a physician's eye marked and multiplied characters, not in one part of the system only but throughout. Applying this comparison, we should be ready to travel with Signor Lombroso into his particular subject. There is a class of criminals to be studied by themselves, perhaps 40 per cent. of the whole. What are their characteristics?

HIS MARKS OR STIGMATA.

It will be observed that we put aside, for the present, that other 60 per cent., whom we may term occasional or accidental delinquents. These have fallen under the law's dominion, not because they were ill-adapted to the order of society, or impelled by anarchic, savage or uncivilized in-

stincts, but in a sudden fit of passion which reasonable motives had stirred up, or weakly following a bad example, or from mistaken heroism, or at least beneath the pressure of want and misery. Their case we will look into when we have dealt with the smaller, but far more dangerous, contingent of the rebels to average morality and recognized modes of subsistence. Crime is the abnormal, the eccentric and unmanageable element which preys upon our system of industry, of marriage, of security, amusement and general intercourse, like some foreign and therefore deadly influence that has made its way into it. Nevertheless, criminals are a species of their own, not mere loose individuals subject to no classification. So much we have certainly proved. Since, then, a species they are, it will be possible to set down their marks or differences, to anatomize the points in which they do not agree with the honest citizen, to form some conjecture respecting the motives on which, though under penalties so grievous, they persevere in doing battle against society; and when all these things have been duly weighed, principles ought to be within our compass whereby to judge between the present discipline, admittedly not successful whether as an attempt at reform or as a means of defense, and the penal code, drawn up by Garofalo, which Lombroso has adopted with certain modifications.

HOW FAR CRIME MAY BE DISEASE.

The new system reposes on a theory of crime and a theory of repression. Crime, it is said,—abstracting from the delinquent who merely happens to be such, and is not so instinctively,—marks off a relatively small number of men and women, whose physical, mental and hereditary diagnosis proclaims them to be diseased. Or, in other words, crime is always in the born delinquent a consequence of degeneration; and it is sometimes the equivalent, or, as I may venture to call it, the allotropic form, of qualities which carry with them by necessity disorder into the system, the seeds either of bad health or of bad conduct. There is a type,—the criminal,—

which has definite and recognizable stigmata. It is founded on comparison of individuals, not all belonging to one class in society; neither all rich, nor all poor; scattered among the educated and the ignorant; never perhaps wanting over any extensive district, and apt to be found in large urban centres; but all exhibiting in their make and habit some of the signs which, when accumulated beyond the number of six or seven in a single man, point him out as an instance of arrested development. If we imagine our 40 per cent. of relapses to be one circle, and all those among criminals that have such signs upon them to be another, then these circles will nearly coincide. Whence it follows, according to Lombroso, that crime of the habitual sort is rooted in the nature of such as give way to it, and is *their* nature,—a kind of original sin, peculiar to them in its power and its manifestations. It implies some anomaly, or set of anomalies, the evidence of which is patent, not merely in what these step-children of the race do, but in what they are. And as Lombroso declines utterly to accept the doctrine of free will, he concludes by telling us that the born criminal is not guilty, but an invalid, "malato non colpevole." And crime itself is an inevitable or necessary ingredient of the social system, as of the nature of these individuals.[1]

DOCTRINE OF "SOCIAL DEFENCE."

"Hereupon," says Lombroso, with an indignation as singularly out of place as it is illogical, "I have been told that with one hand I destroy human responsibility, and with the other I abolish the Penal Code. Ma, non è vero niente. I do not allow crime to run wild; on the contrary, I make its repression more certain and secure. The shame attending upon evil deeds freely done, of course, no longer will follow upon mere natural, necessitated impulses which their victim cannot resist; nay, which it is impossible that he should, when they have attained a given force, be desirous of resisting. There will be no shame on his part, and no moral reproof on mine. In this sense, 'tout connaître c'est tout

1 L. Preface xxiv. and *passim*.

pardonner.' But we control molecular movements which threaten an explosion, although in them is neither will nor freedom. On the same principle, we shall check the doings of the born criminal, exactly as if he were some malignant energy that must be met and thwarted. Such is the doctrine of social defence. We cease to talk of punishment and retribution. We abhor the *lex talionis*, which has survived from barbarous ages. We do not aim at reforming those whom experience proves to be incapable of learning self-control. Preventive measures, direct and indirect, we can put in motion. The young criminal, if he is caught soon enough, may be tamed or kept under strict custody. The elder should, perhaps, in extreme cases, be eliminated. When he is suffered to live, he must not roam at large. Perpetual confinement is the only safeguard ; or else a military supervision which will see that he maintains himself, that he does not injure his fellow-men, that as much benefit as his condition allows is derived from his now well-directed action to the society on which he was wont to prey. Short sentences, frequent opening of the prison-doors, pardons from the Crown, amnesties and graces, are all to be done away as among the perennial sources of relapse, and an encouragement to propagate the race of delinquents. If trial by jury is still permitted—and in many parts of the world it is an iniquitous, anti-social institution—there must be likewise set up trial by physicians, who shall examine the prisoner and describe him according to psycho-physical methods. Thus, in short, the new doctrine assimilates crime to insanity, though recognizing some distinction between them as of species comprehended under the same genus. No questions need be raised touching degrees of responsibility ; no excuse admitted on the plea of irresistible impulse, moral mania, or lack of deliberation. The prison will be henceforth an asylum for born delinquents ; and those who are delinquents on occasion, if there be any such, shall be separated from these, and either allowed to go free, or in ways suitable to their disposition, shall be protected from the consequences of so mere an episode in otherwise useful existences."

WE MUST SAY "DISTINGUO."

These are not, to the letter, my author's very words; but I am sure that they do him no injustice. They express, with the brevity which is all I can command, the substance of many hundreds of pages in these great volumes; and, while the denial of freedom is lamentable, and in practice may do more harm than Lombroso with his sentiments can realize, we feel as we are listening, how much requires to be distinguished, to be sifted and sifted again, if we would cast out the evil and keep the good. Never, it seems to me, were social teachers more decidedly under obligation to discern these opposed elements from one another, lest they should, in a haste as little justified as Lombroso's impetuous negations, overlook the beginnings of a better, because more comprehensive, individual, and precise system in dealing with criminals, which is here, I will not say shadowed forth, so much as painted in gross and staring colors. It is a rude, and even a mischievous commencement; but a commencement it certainly is.

Thus Barine has told us that "the conclusions of this new school are immediately visible. The penalties inflicted can no longer be the same; nor the principles in virtue of which our courts pass judgment; nor the scope and purpose of penitentiary systems. The most momentous functions of the social organism must undergo a complete transformation. The new method will be as indifferent as Nature herself; and will display the austerity which is a mark of indifference. It will not be cruel, for it will not any more cherish indignation in regard to the guilty. Him it will either suppress or sequestrate from society, in neither case hating him; the right of defence will be substituted for the duty of punishment, which was a mere survival from the old religious idea of sin. Metaphysicians may enter their protest; but who will mind them? For the will is not free in honest men any more than it is in the dishonest; and we do not rebel against facts but make the best of them." [1]

1 Lombroso, I. xx.

I answer that we shall not rebel against ascertained truths. And the Catholic religion has a philosophy and a power of its own, which out of materials less promising knows how to elicit an ordered life, a scheme of things big with advantage to mankind. With patience, insight, and a little attention to our St. Thomas and our Aristotle, we shall, I dare say, find the true measure in which crime has affinities with disease, and how far the method of social defence is applicable. Lombroso sins by exclusive and exaggerated statements; by ignorance of metaphysics, religion, and history; by premature induction; and by bringing down his immense variety of facts to Spencerian formulas. Against all this we have the means of guarding ourselves. But if, on carefully reviewing the evidence, we see grounds for a change in certain procedures at law, in the management of prisons, and in the training of children, both inside reformatories and outside of them, we shall be none the worse off, although our instruction has been derived from a teacher who mingles wisdom and ignorance perhaps in nearly equal proportions.

I hope, therefore, to deal with the analysis of the criminal in a second paper; and with the doctrine of social defence in a third, which will conclude my present undertaking.

WILLIAM BARRY.

Dorchester, England.

STUDENT LIFE IN ROME.

IN attempting to outline seminary life in Rome, we shall mainly consider the influences which surround the student in relation to his religious or scientific training. It will not be necessary to dwell upon the professedly religious exercises, for as our readers know, these are practically the same in all our Seminaries. In like manner, everyone is familiar with the general course of study, and we shall limit ourselves to speak of its treatment by professors, and of methods of study. Incidentally too we shall have occasion to dwell on the manner in which the students employ the hours of necessary relaxation.

The course of study consists of four daily lectures, one hour each. These are given at the University of the Propaganda, two in the forenoon, from eight to ten o'clock, and two in the afternoon. A feature of these afternoon lectures novel to an American is the fact that the time at which they are delivered is subject to periodical changes. They commence three hours and a half before the "Ave Maria,"[1] which fixes the standard for the general arrangement of the Roman afternoon. Since the hour of the "Ave Maria" varies with the setting of the sun, from five until after eight o'clock, the time for attending class varies accordingly. The object of this arrangement is that the student may avoid the cold of the evening in winter, and the heat of the Italian sun in summer. A walk of an hour and a half, with a visit to the Blessed Sacrament in one of the churches, occupies the time between the close of the lectures and the "Ave." On Thursdays there is a walk of an hour and a half in the morning, and another of three hours in the afternoon. The students also take a long walk on Sunday afternoons. Occasionally tours of a more extended character are allowed, especially when any object of real interest or instruction, such as the catacombs or some historic suburban locality, calls for a longer expedition. The evenings are spent at home in study, and in the ordinary duties of seminary life.

1 The Angelus prayer is simply called the "Ave Maria."

A GROUP OF AMERICAN COLLEGE STUDENTS

COLLEGE OF THE PROPAGANDA, ROME.

Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the system of instruction is what might be called the broad catholicity of its spirit. In the philosophical and theological classes the teachings of the Angelic Doctor form the basis of the professor's work; excepting this there is but little adherence to text books; for the yearly course of lectures represents an experienced instructor's skillful choice of what is best in published works, as well as the matured result of his own original study. There are however some authors which are considered regular class-books, such as Lorinzelli's *Institutiones* for the classes of Logic and Metaphysics; in Canon Law, Solieri's *Praelectiones* and Zitelli's *Apparatus Juris Ecclesiastici*; in "Locis," Hurter, with references to Mazella and Franzelin; in "Moral," Gury with Ballerini's notes as revised by Palmieri. In their respective classes, these furnish the material, but they are greatly amplified and their order is often changed. As a general rule the various class hours are entirely occupied by the professor himself, yet recitations are not infrequent. The taking of notes during the lecture is of course a *sine qua non* to deriving the proper advantage therefrom.

In the principal classes pertaining to the philosophical and theological courses the following professors teach at present: In Logic, R. D. Camillus Laurenti; in Metaphysics, R. P. Peregrinus Stagni, Ord. Serv. B. M. V.; in Ethics, R. D. Raimundus Volpi; in Canon Law, R. D. Franciscus Solieri; in Liturgy, R. D. Monsig. Alfonsus Carinci; in Archaeology, Prof. Horatius Marucchi; in "Locis," R. D. Monsig. Paulus Leva; in Ecclesiastical History, R. D. Joseph Penacchi; in "Moral," R. D. Monsig. Petrus Checchi; in "Dogma," R. P. Alexius Maria Lepicier, Ord. Serv. B. M. V., and R. D. Laurentius Lauri; in Scripture, R. D. Bernardus Colombo; in Mathematics, R. D. Joannes Corti; in Physics and Chemistry, R. D. Monsig. Joseph Buti. These instructors, all men of eminence in their respective branches, add to a thorough mastery of the studies which they treat an intimate knowledge of the spirit and practice of the Church, many of them holding important

positions in the Roman Curia, or in the various administrative Congregations. Their teaching is marked by a constant recurrence to fundamental principles; and the earnest student may receive at their hands a store of knowledge which will eminently qualify him for successful work, and give him a secure basis for any future superstructure. With all this, they place themselves, as it were, at the disposal of the student for the purpose of explaining in detail any difficulties that may arise. It is fortunate that the students are taught to regard these professors at once with great reverence and great freedom, an apparent result of the fact that professors and students alike find themselves in the presence of influences which, while they strengthen what is really good, at the same time brush away, as of no value, that which is merely conventional.

Among the students themselves there are many of exceptional talent, as might be supposed from the fact that they represent the choice of the place whence they come, and the inter-action of so many varying elements of trained intelligence is extremely favorable to the development of broad, comprehensive ideas, while at the same time lessening that tendency to self-assertion in matters of opinion which so frequently shows itself in gifted minds. Besides these general advantages, it may be noted that the cosmopolitan character of his surroundings possesses a peculiar value for the American student, since his own people, the people with whom he will have to deal, is composed of elements similarly diverse; and thus without special effort he may here acquire from an observation of individuals that which should hereafter prove the secret of successful influence upon large masses of society.

To this general process of expansion and intellectual development the system of instruction pursued in Rome contributes not a little. The very absence of class authors, though somewhat embarrassing at first, leads the student to look about for original sources, and to attain gradually a more vigorous and independent method of research. Besides this, the traditions of the great institution which he daily attends

IN THE GARDEN OF THE COLLEGE,
ROME.

INNER COURT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE, ROME.

soon become his own, and he is thus brought into close touch with the most advanced religious and scientific thought. Generally speaking, class matter absorbs almost his entire attention, and thus the foundations of a distinctly ecclesiastical culture are laid more deeply than is usually the case where there is greater latitude of action. There are probably few Roman students who do not experience a very appreciable feeling of regret that the limits of their receptive powers prevent them from assimilating the wealth of rich material all around them; yet on the whole students and professors accomplish a vast amount of earnest and effective work every year. Of course these advantages do not force themselves upon one. He must labor hard in order to secure their fruit, while, if he does so, the reward is almost immediate.

At home, in the College itself, there are classes in Italian and in Gregorian Chant, and weekly reviews of Philosophy and Theology. In addition to these, the students about to be ordained are instructed in the details of pastoral theology, especial care being given to the matter of preaching. Physical training is not neglected, a skilled professor being in regular service at the College.

Apart from the pursuit of regular study there are many elements which aid the student in improving his mind even whilst he takes his recreation. Greatest of all perhaps is the vividness with which the great historic issues of the past and the great truths of faith are made to appeal to the dweller in the Eternal City in all their true, calm, absolute reality. There are two Romes here, each in the most distinct and detailed opposition to the other—the imperial pagan city, of which enough has disappeared to show the complete destruction of its guilty power, yet of which enough remains to serve as a stern reminder of divine justice, as well as to attest the once great exterior magnificence that had surrounded these mouldering piles. The other Rome is the city of God reigning above the ruins of Satan's greatest stronghold. It is the mighty living heart of Christendom still pulsing with countless martyrs' blood, the myriad consecrated reliquary

in which earth holds for heaven the sacred remains of those in whose lives every vice has been rebuked, and every virtue is illustrated; it is the enduring trophy of the Nazarene's unending triumph. Like the traveller who from the loftiest peak of some mountain range looks first, indeed, at the vast expanse of sky and cloud which his toil has made as it were his own, yet, wearying of a brightness not to be long sustained, turns his gaze once more upon the cities and rivers of the plain, amid which he has been travelling and to which he must return, so, in Rome, one feels that he has reached all that earth can give of the exterior riches of the Church, and his mind, though indeed it cannot but mount to the glories of another world, must still return to a calm consideration of life and duty in their actual conditions; and before his earthward turning gaze there here arise on every side numberless objects either recalling the most revolting memories of human degradation, or filled with the beautiful recollections of angelic souls glorious with every form and phase of the ineffable sweetness and beauty that flash from the very throne of God upon exhalted human virtue.

To stand upon the Palatine hill amid the ruined palaces of the Cæsars, in fancy to complete their broken arches, and once again to clothe their vast, majestic proportions with the marble wealth that once rendered their whole extent a dream of iridescent splendor, and then to gaze upon the crude, unsightly masses which even in the days of their glory formed their real substance, and which are now all that remain; to reflect upon all this is to behold the traces of the human soul with its inextinguishable longings for what is glorious and magnificent; but it is also to behold it as blinded and groping in a fruitless search. The memory of these vast marble halls is fraught with the deepest dishonor and disgrace of our common nature, yet as we turn our eyes from them we recognize at their very side the signs of the places where Peter and Paul suffered and died for the faith of their Master, and for the sake of those He loved; and together with these we seem to behold a white-robed army of martyrs and confessors whose blood has dyed the

very soil of the city, or whose lives have forever sanctified it, raising shrines and temples on every side to tell us that even here the false maxims of the world have been supplanted by the heavenly wisdom of the Gospel, and to proclaim, among these ruins of the proudest power that earth has ever known, the never-ending kingdom of Jesus Christ.

That such influences exercise a real and efficacious power upon the individual is fully evidenced in the rapid transformation they frequently bring about in the seminarist with whom spiritual development is ordinarily of slower growth. Let us say a word about the discipline and practices which the student follows in the Seminary. The form of government is very simple. The entire discipline of the house is under the immediate control of the rector, who discharges the duties usually devolving upon disciplinarians. The students are divided into "cameratas," or bands, averaging ten members each. At present there are seven of these, each of which is in charge of a prefect and sub-prefect, both taken from the ranks of the students themselves, the usual requirements of sound judgment and exemplary conduct governing their selection. The rule is read once a year by the rector; the strictest obedience to it is required. The prefects are directly responsible to the rector, and every member of the community understands that any manifestation of real unfitness for his position would at once terminate his connection with the College. The simplicity of this arrangement, taken in connection with the known requirements of ecclesiastical superiors, would naturally lead us to find what we might call, in a good sense, the *esprit de corps* prevailing among the students. After the prudent oversight of the superior, the main conserving element of the elevated ecclesiastical spirit of the community is the collective good sense and good will, which, without noise of words, establish and maintain a high standard of community life and feeling. So efficient is this simple system that the interposition of the superior is very rarely called for, and even then for the greater part the cases are those in which the head rather than the heart has gone wrong.

As to the distinctly religious training itself, it differs in nothing from that of the average Seminary. There is a resident spiritual director, and the confessions of the students are heard by two Jesuit fathers who come regularly to the College.

After all the toil and labor there comes a day—and it comes very rapidly in Rome—when, for good or evil, the year's tasks are over. The day on which the vacation begins the students make ready to leave Rome.

On the appointed day all take the train which carries them across the campagna by the side, for leagues, of the ruined aqueduct whose ever succeeding arches frame the fleeting landscape into a multitude of views beautiful with nature's inimitable art. An hour's journey brings the train by a circuitous, ascending route to Frascati, where the students alight and start across the hills to their own home some two miles distant. It is about the fifteenth of July, and they will not return until the twentieth of October.

The American Villa is situated in Grottaferata, a small settlement on the slopes of the ancient Tusculum and about fifteen miles southeast of Rome. The surrounding country is rich in historic interest, and the mountains and villages afford many beautiful views. The Mediterranean sparkles in the distance, and there are glimpses of the Tiber as it steals away to the sea. The Eternal City itself lies far below in the midst of the vast campagna, and one may watch the cloud-cast shadows as they come and go upon the great dome of St. Peter's. Farther on, the bleak Sabines, with here and there a village in their clefts, rise like a massive wall of white from the brown and level plain, enclosing what seems like a vast arena roughly smoothed by nature's hand, in order that all nations might contend on equal terms for the seven-columned throne of universal empire. Over all come cooling breezes from the sea tempering the summer heat and giving additional life and vigor to the mountain air. Amid these beautiful and peaceful surroundings those who have shared together the toils and trials of the city share also the pleasures of release and relaxation ren-

THE REFECTORY OF THE STUDENTS



SUMMER HOUSE OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE,
GROTTAFERATA.

dered doubly pleasing and profitable because guarded and sanctified by the same holy influences which had surrounded so many of their hours of labor. There is no interruption of community life. Prayer and meditation, silence and study, succeed one another in almost the same order and time as before. The long walks in the afternoons and the walk in the morning are the chief variations from home life in the city. Excursions are frequently arranged which occupy the whole day, or at times several days together; however, the seminary discipline is maintained without other interruption.

In concluding our sketch we are conscious of having dwelt rather upon the favorable aspects of the picture. There are of course things to which the American student becomes only slowly accustomed. Indeed, life in Rome's training school would be but a poor preparation for the self-denying ministry of Christ and the exacting requirements of the American mission if there were not. But all know that the road to sanctity and knowledge is not without difficulties whether in Rome or elsewhere. We have noted only the facts and feelings which life in Rome seems most often to impress upon the mind of the ecclesiastical student from beyond the sea. Like all other forces, physical or moral, Roman influences require suitable subjects, but it seems a mere statement of fact to say that to the proper class of students, (and by this we mean those who are considerably advanced in the discipline of mind and heart proceeding principally from intrinsic sources), Rome offers a perhaps unparalleled opportunity for the development of the great qualities which should specially distinguish the ambassador of Christ.

QUIRINUS, D. D.

Rome, Italy.

MODERN MATERIALISM AND ITS METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY.

"The proper study of mankind is man."

THE poet used his words in the formal sense, and in that sense he wished them to be taken. The proper study of mankind is man *as* man. Man is not merely an animal body with, somehow or other, an attachment of consciousness and memory and attention and speech. But he is chiefly and essentially a spiritual, immortal soul, with the power of abstract thought and with liberty of choice. He is a being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong; capable of discerning his obligations under an eternal, natural law, as well as his responsibility to the eternal Lawgiver for the moral rectitude of his choice. This is the man that is the proper study of mankind. The nerves, the muscles and the bones, all the tissues and the mechanism of the body may form a very interesting study, but they do not constitute the "proper" study indicated by the poet. There is much that hinges upon all this and which is most deserving of our anxious thought at the present hour. The study of man has become a common pursuit in schools, both high and low; but unfortunately this study is of the animal body and not of the spiritual soul. "A little learning is a dangerous thing," and a half-education in the "proper" study, especially when the better half is ignored, is bound to become a disastrous thing. It has, in fact, already become a very disastrous thing.

In the purely secular education, so much clamored for and so much tried, there has been going on, for a long time, a divorcing of the soul from the God to whom it owes the submission of its intellect and will in the obedience of faith and works. In that same education there has been sown and developed a seed of perversion, the eradication of which is going to prove even to us a more formidable task than any of the great educational enterprises which we have heretofore attempted and partially accomplished. It is something more subtle than intangible bigotry or liberal (?) cowardice. It is

the difficulty that arises in the pandemonium where all the forces of error eventually and logically combine, the difficulty which we must always expect to encounter at the point where the logical extremes of false doctrines meet. It is plain materialism disguised under a hundred learned names. It has been growing visibly for a decade of years; and if things go on at the pace they have fallen into, half a dozen years will not elapse before we shall have to struggle with a practical error more plausible, more alluring and more insidious than any we have had to cope with.

I know that there are good easy men who are fond of calling others alarmists; men who are unwilling to concede danger until they are tossed in their beds by the earthquake or until they quake in their stockings as they gaze at the passing of the red-handed mob. And even then, unless their own fair bodies have been bruised or scorched, they will simply say that it was all very extraordinary. Were they to credit distant premonitions, it would disturb their easy, honorable lives; for they would then be in decency bound to show an interest in promoting the establishment of safeguards. Whenever a danger, whether moral, doctrinal, social, political or domestic, will allow them to go into the next world without insisting upon performing the service of translation for them, they speak of it as something that is not worthy of consideration. In their strength of character, their broad, brave wisdom born of personal security is to ignore those distant dangers that they may die out; and to leave things alone that they may right themselves. Indeed, it is well that there are some alarmists; else, under the tutelage of these suave men who are great at dinners and at functions, the world would never have an alarm. The world would be buried in sleep at the advent of every storm.

At this moment, though much silence is kept about the fact, there is a dense miasma of materialism settling down upon our society. And the great silence is the greatest proof of the fact: it is proof that the poison has passed into the blood of the social system. The terror bred of the twenty-five years of war after the murder of Louis XVI.,

drove out the popular materialism which was growing beside the rationalism of the last century. But the spirit of the evil, in abeyance, was nourished in the shadows of the universities, and was biding its time for the occasion which would be offered to it to renew its entrance into popular favor. It found that occasion in the appearance of Mr. Darwin's book upon *The Origin of Species*, in 1859. Covering itself with the hypothesis, and stretching the hypothesis so as to give itself shelter at every point, it became fierce, menacing and aggressive; and, to believe the bulletins issued by its Coryphaei from the seat of war, it had, in about twenty years, captured and demolished every stronghold of faith, dogma and credulity built from the days of Genesis. But there was a very fine war waged upon it in the periodical literature of that day, that is to say, on paper; and on paper it was routed. It was shown to beget so foul and lawless an ethics for the individual, for the family and for society at large that no man was willing to be called a materialist. The doctrinal refutation was triumphant, and the brave defenders of truth retired from the field. But the spirit of materialism was not dead; and being now left with freest scope, it set to work to gather and organize its forces and to specialize the work of its recruits. Extending the formula of the Darwinian hypothesis from the narrow field of "species" to the indefinite range of *all being*, it insinuated itself as the indispensable fundamental assumption for intelligent work in archæology, general biology, zoölogy, morphology, physiology, chemistry, etc. With a single bold stroke it obliterated the differences between contradictory metaphysical and ideological systems. Assuming itself as the starting point, it embraced them all by identifying them with itself and assuming that their variations came merely from the incidental circumstance that they looked at things from different points of view and had committed themselves to different terminologies. Under a new name, "monism," a name as well conciliatory as universalizing, it first intruded itself as a working hypothesis all along the line of the natural, physical sciences; once entered, it was careful to refer to

itself always and only as a fact that was not to be questioned; and finally it so completely appropriated to its uses the broad name of *science*, that in the present common acceptation of the term they alone are devoted to science who are busy seeking for and collating facts for the announcement of some new law governing the manifestation of phenomena in matter.

It is good to follow the rule of dealing with difficulties one by one. Moreover, in selecting the difficulty with which we are immediately to engage, it is wise to make choice of a leading one, the settling of which may perhaps mean the settling of many others. Whoever has followed thoughtfully the history of education will have noticed that every important movement has depended very much upon a name, and that the adequate understanding of the movement depends upon the comprehensive interpretation of that name. Such a name, adopted in our day to signalize a movement whose waves are intended to vibrate to the borders of all science, is "Evolution." The name as so adopted is used in the monistic sense, the one-and-all sense. As so used it has also, so to say, other names concentric, indicative of the subsidiary movements which are integral parts of the whole. Two wide, concentric paths across which the movement has to spread from the monistic centre in order that the name, evolution, may embrace in its simple and identical significance whatever is to be found within the great-circle of science, are those belts wherein the movement is manifested as being occupied with two certain phases of objective reality, human thought and human spontaneity or volition. Turning to the objective, these two phases of the one reality are found very difficult to deal with, yet it is necessary for the entire scheme that they be coördinated as mere mechanical sequences of other phases of the one-and-all that makes up the universe. It has been found impossible to reduce them to the subordination which is necessary for the welfare of the general plan. Hence the tireless efforts at deceit which are made with the view of disposing the public to regard them in the light of the universal, mechanical evolution. Hence the sudden

start into prominence—or degradation—of two studies in the names of which we shall find the key to certain grave theoretical and practical attitudes of minds. And these two names are psychology and ethics.

The scientific study of ethics must necessarily be preceded by the scientific study of psychology. An ethical doctrine can not be reliable, but only false and calamitous, when it is not based upon an absolutely secure psychology. The promoters of the monistic, materialistic, evolutionary scheme have not waited for a certification upon the ground of psychology before trespassing upon the field of ethics. They know well enough that were they so to wait they would have to wait forever. They know that the pseudo-scientific acceptance of their ethics will follow very easily if they can bias minds to look upon their psychology as satisfactory without proof; and they know that the strongest popular justification of this kind for their materialistic psychology is a practical materialistic life. Hence it is that they are even now working more or less quietly at an ethics, upon the presumption of a psychology. And, indeed, as we see, the ethics is already manifesting itself practically, a real "ethics of dust." But whilst this most potent argument of practice is being insidiously applied, their greatest open endeavor is spent in familiarizing minds with the psychological tenets necessary to give to the ethics an apparent scientific basis. They have learned by experience that the familiarity begotten of repetition often disabuses men of the dread with which nature inspires them of that which is radically wrong. A multitude of experiments is all that most men demand for the acceptance of a conclusion that does not follow. Hence, "psychology" is the name laureate to-day. We shall not have to wait long to see the diadem transferred to "ethics" or "conduct" which will rule as the Nemesis of all the false philosophies that have come up from the beginning.

It is of prime importance, then, at the present hour, that we turn ourselves to a serious consideration of what is implied both theoretically and practically in the name, psychology, as it is commonly used to-day. It would have been

better had we followed the manœuvres of the enemy during ten years past, and prevented the establishment of the word in the signification which it has received. Psychology, as we used to understand it, was the study of the soul; of the invisible, vital principle, the principle of thought. The soul works with the organs of the body, the brain, the eye, the ear, but it works without them, too, when it thinks. It is the bond of unity in the individual person, and it is by reason of it as bond, as unifier, as source, as vivifier of the body, that all the actions can be predicated of the same identical person. It can work through the body, but it is no part of the body. It pursues its thought in the higher, spiritual order, and, at the same time, in virtue of its superior efficiency, gives the life touch to the animal body.

Pondering over the multitudinous physical changes which the body is constantly undergoing, and the ever varying, shifting moods, impulses, thoughts and emotions, and contradictory desires that are endlessly replacing each the other, we have always felt rationally justified in holding that there is within us something permanent, a something by reason of which we declare upon the testimony of consciousness and memory the continuous identity of self. And we are certain that that which is thus permanent is more radically and indispensably self than any or all of those endless modifications which come and go, and which might have been entirely other than they have been, without change in the identity of the radical principle in which they have been unified. It is this one continuous something which is the bond of unity of all that belongs to self. This it is which is conscious and remembers. All else within us changes. It alone endures. What is it? Whence is it? Whither does it tend? Behold the great questions of psychology!

This conscious root of permanency appropriates to itself the predication of all that can be said of the individual ego in its entirety. It is the root-subject of all that goes on in the ego whether actively or passively; of thought, sensation, volition, emotion, passion, the gravitation and warmth of the body. All is referred to the ego. I think, I will, I

suffer, I move, I hear, I fall, I see, I ride. The very same ego, I, thought, willed, suffered, moved in days gone by. It is the very same ego, the root of identity and permanency, which is the subject of all predications in the past and in the present. It is the same permanent ego, therefore, to which belong radically all these potencies and capabilities commonly called Faculties or Powers.

We have here, then, two great facts, two undeniable and primary facts: the permanent unity of the ego and the variety of its efficiency or capability. In the rational development of these two facts we have the whole science of psychology. What, then, radically, is this conscious self? For it is a very distinct something. What is this foundation, basis, support, this bond, this unifier, this recorder, this SOUL of all that comes and goes? What is this something which at fourscore years with life's span traversed, can look back and proclaim its identity with the child that wept and laughed and planned and felt its grievous wrongs, three-quarters of a century before? We call it soul. The work of psychology consists essentially in eliciting the unprejudiced reply of reason to three very definite questions about this soul: What? Whence? Whither? The answer to the first question supplies the groundwork for the answers to the second and the third. The data for the answer to the first question have to be supplied primarily, mainly, essentially, indispensably, by the testimony of the conscious self about itself.

Now, all who have studied psychology in its integrity know that consciousness gives testimony to a two-fold manifestation of activity on the part of the ego. In the one kind of activity, as manifested, matter enters as a necessary auxiliary. In the other, matter is necessarily excluded by the very terms in which the manifestation must be expressed. These two phases of activity in which the permanent principle and root of the conscious ego manifests itself, are called sense-life and spirit-life. In each of these again we have the two correlative spheres of cognition and appetition. There is thus a sense-cognition and a spiritual cognition; a sense-appetition and

a spiritual appetition. Pure sense-cognition and pure sense-appetition are of the animal order and are found in the brute animal. Pure spiritual cognition and pure spiritual appetition are of a higher order, the intellectual order, and are found in man but not in the brute. Matter is necessarily excluded from all participation in any and every act of purely spiritual cognition or appetition. Matter, then, cannot be the principle or part of the principle from which the act of spiritual cognition or appetition proceeds. What is the consequence of this? Which is the distinctive activity of the root-principle of the conscious ego? Is it the sense-life or is it the spirit-life? It must be the spirit-life. For, the one and same identical ego which acts with and through matter, acts also in such a way as to exclude matter absolutely from any participation in its act. One and the same root-principle of the conscious ego which is absorbed in abstract thought and which wills the things of which there can be no sense-cognition does also exercise sense-perception through the organs of the body which it vivifies. Consciousness testifies to the identity of the ego seeing and the ego thinking. There cannot be two distinct individuals in the ego that sees and the ego that thinks, although the ego that speculates repudiates matter from any participation in its operation, whilst it demands a certain intimate coöperation of matter in the act of seeing, which cannot be exercised without the vivified organ. Which then is the distinctive activity of this root-principle of the identical ego. It must be the activity which it exercises without the instrumentality or intimate coöperation of matter. For, if it can act without matter, and it does act without matter as we see, matter cannot enter into its essential constitution. This root-principle, therefore, this unifier, this bond of identity of the ego, this permanent something in the midst of unceasing change, this same subject of all predications in the past and in the future, this SOUL, must be something into the constitution of which matter does not enter; for, if matter entered into its very nature, it could not be free from matter in its act.

We have here a very clearly defined, immovable, unchangeable basis upon which all truly scientific psychological work must rest, to which it must always bear an assignable relation, and the fundamental necessity of which it may never presume to call in question if it would be regarded as scientific work at all. And yet what do we find? Anyone who has paid attention to the movement, I cannot call it progress, of education, must have observed, when considering this matter of psychology, a very fatal decadence in the methods pursued, in the psychological knowledge acquired and in the resultant mental fitness for philosophical studies in general. To this have we come that, at this hour, the name, psychology, is understood by most of those who use the term to indicate the study of the phenomena of animal life. This something or these dozen somethings which are called psychology make no profession of anything beyond the observation of animal functions as found in man and as illustrated and paralleled in the purely sense-life of brutes. In most cases psychology is understood to be nothing more than a conglomerate of physiological facts. Of course, a certain knowledge, a broad and not minutely detailed knowledge of physiology where it touches upon the perceptive organism, the nervous system and the senses, is useful in working towards the great issues of psychology. But the wonder and the misery is, that in many instances a minute investigation of the nerve-apparatus has been allowed to usurp the place and the name of the science to which such investigation is only subsidiary, and even as subsidiary necessary only in a limited degree. And when at times the study does try to rise a little above mere physiology and the investigation of nerve-action, when it does attempt to formulate laws of attention, and laws for the false judgments that so often follow sense-perception, particularly vision, it does not yet become psychology, it does not become philosophy. It always fails to touch, indeed it dreads to touch the root-principle and subject of all these sense-manifestations, and when it does not deny the spiritual soul, it turns away from the thought of so intangible a thing as being fit to serve

merely for speculations that are the most unwarranted waste of time.

"Psychology" has become what is called a popular study, that is to say not necessarily a favorite study, but at all events a common study. As such it is popularly or commonly supposed to consist in observing the details of sensation, attention, intention, muscular response, popular misjudgments regarding the objects of certain sense-perceptions, etc. All that is demanded of the scholar is that he have the use of his senses, sight, hearing, touch, etc., that he apply these senses by observation to the phenomena presented, that he cultivate the power of attention, and that he store the results away in memory as best he can. Psychology, so understood, is very easily taught in varying degree all the way along the educational scale from the kindergarten to the university; and in proportion to the time given and the pupil's capacity, the science can be carried off in fractional bits from the dozen facts to the thousand. Hence it has come to pass that nearly every youth of a few years' schooling is supposed to have made a course of psychology!

In all this experimentation upon the transmission of impulses along the nerves, what has become of the great questions? The great questions, the truly philosophical questions, are at best overlooked, ignored, pronounced intangible and useless. So that instead of the rational, metaphysical science, instead of the truly exalted speculative science, we see in psychology, as it is almost universally taught, nothing more than a classification of material phenomena which is put upon a level with that multitude of classifications of matter for which and the dignifying of which our age of clay has wished to arrogate exclusive right to the name of SCIENCE. We know very well that in the study of psychology it is necessary, to a certain extent, to consider the data, visible, tangible, or otherwise sensible, which *accompany* thought, either as being the *occasion* of it or as being *occasioned* by it; but we have to be careful to the last degree never to make the *accompaniment* stand for everything and thus to ignore the supra-sensible conscious principle to whose activity it is

only an accompaniment. The consequence of the misuse and popularizing degradation of a consecrated philosophic name is, that any nerve-experimenter may to-day pose as a psychologist, and the youth of the period is being indoctrinated with a materialism which saps the font of all those religious and moral principles which are so essential to the individual and social welfare of mankind. For, we cannot escape the conclusion, that, if man as a perceptive being is only a net-work of nerves and if the material brain is the principle of thought, then there is no moral law and the restrictions of society are an unbearable tyranny over the individual instinct. It may be well to note, here, that it is under the particular name of psychology that the educational publications of the day run riot. The lowering of the name, the final liberation of a science from the control of musty metaphysicians, the pell-mell rush after the novelty and the sudden demand for "psychological" primers, outlines, elements, compendiums, as a substitute for spelling, grammar, history, literary and other antiquated fundamentals in a liberal education, have emboldened many to the effort of collecting all sorts of curious facts from the domain of neural physics, and to the enterprise of putting their collections upon the market under the successful label of the hour, "psychology." It is said that during the past year no less than three hundred "psychological" contributions were made to the literary flood.

Every one is now psychologist. Every one who can make an experiment on the nerves is competent to write an article on psychology, and finds no difficulty in getting a magazine to publish his article. The popular credulity is amazing. The daily papers, fully abreast of their business, cite startling facts from unknown experimenters, which are superseded by facts still more startling, on the morrow; and the people read and believe and are ready for anything. Within the twelve-month a certain popular science monthly printed an article which dealt chiefly with the utilizing of the "Roentgen" rays for photographing the image on the retina. This image was spoken of as the "idea." But the article

was not content with photographing the idea. It had to go to the length of photographing the universal idea. Now, according to the article the universal idea was photographed in this wise: Several persons looked through tubes which converged to the centre of a sensitized plate upon which the picture was to be taken. Each of the persons thought of "cat." The theory was, that as each one thought of "cat," choosing an individual cat *ad libitum*, there was produced upon the retina a cat-image by the outward process, as there would be by the inward process during the real visual perception of a cat. This image on the retina was the idea. It was possible to photograph this image by means of the X-ray. The photograph would be the photograph of an idea, of the idea of a cat. In the case under consideration there were several persons looking into tubes which converged to the same spot upon a sensitized plate in the camera. The Roentgen ray was applied so as to light up the several cat-images and the several images were reproduced upon the plate in a "composite." This composite was the photograph of the universal idea. This wonderful discovery produced no little stir amongst those who owned cameras; for, they could not do the trick. When the writer of the article thought the matter had gone far enough, he informed these anxious psychologists that his story was altogether of the Jules Verne order. The wonder ceased. But the wonder still remains. For, not one of all the critics called attention to the purely materialistic terminology in which the experiment was presented, nor to the purest of pure materialism in the conclusion announced. It would be almost impossible to make a critical commentary on the article, which is but one illustration taken at random out of ten thousand to show the magnitude of the task of correction which has been already set for us. We see here the insidiousness and the depth of the danger which lies in the path of those who are thirsting for or who are obliged to apply themselves to the pursuit of "popular science." The article in question was nothing more than a bubble on the surface of a tide which is sweeping through the channels of education. Where shall

we have to begin in order to stem this tide before it becomes a roaring torrent? How might we even approach in order to pierce that little bubble which, like every quackery, was floating securely under a Greek name as the bearer of a significant message from the toilers in the realm of "science." You might deny a fact. But that would be very little. The masses you have to deal with are accustomed to deny to-day the facts that were discovered yesterday. You will have to make each mind a *tabula rasa*, and begin from the beginning to write the truth upon it. But here you have the fundamental difficulty that the minds you must enlighten will still cling to their first principle: "Blessed are they who have not believed because they have not seen."

A condensed paper, such as this is, allows no room for the multiplication of examples. I shall be content with one more fact, as an illustration of its general import. Less than forty moons ago I chanced to be in a great metropolitan centre of education. Whilst there I received from a leading lady educator a note of request for information regarding the formation of a class in ethics. As the need for information was urgent, and as it could not be supplied satisfactorily by means of a few hasty letters, a day was arranged for an interview. In the interview I learned that the following points had been determined upon for the future class:

1. There was to be no text-book;

2. There was to be no Professor to deliver lectures;

3. There was to be no course of principles, no building from a foundation;

4. The intention was, to study ethics in literature;

5. Certain supposed ethical topics were to be discussed in the meetings. These topics were Love, Faith (sic), Courage,—and others;

6. These topics were to be discussed as found in certain books;

7. The list of books presented to me contained Robert Elsmere, etc., etc.;

8. Mr. X., Ladies' Philosophical-Lecturer-in-ordinary-on-the-Unintelligible was to be the guiding spirit of the class;

9. The members did not yet know how the class was to be carried on, for they had not yet held their first meeting. It was all an experiment, and they did not know what it would come to;

10. My personal aid to the organization of the class, I was told, was to consist in the suggestion of certain wholesome books.—Whereupon, I did suggest certain chapters of wholesome novels which were of a higher order of literature than any on the list.

With the suggestion my coöperation ended—not so the interview. I held in my hand a little book on ethics. I forced the conversation into ethics. In this way I elicited many questions. I answered promptly each time by referring to the book with which I happened to be familiar; and this I did in order to indicate that all these questions were answered very definitely in print. In a few minutes I discovered that Madame knew nothing whatsoever of ethics, not even the meaning of the name. Then I insisted upon the necessity of proceeding logically in a matter so important, until at my first hiatus, I was suddenly staggered at the announcement gravely and sweetly made: "I do not know much about logic, but I have been teaching psychology for six years!" Now here is the pertinent fact, that Madame, who knew not how to distinguish a demonstration from a sophism, and who knew not that there are essential fundamental principles upon which all true ethical science must be based, was stumbling through a materialistic text-book, unable to detect any of its sophistry, powerless to guard the unsuspecting youth committed to her care against the bestial ethics which was to be the natural outcome of their materialistic psychology. Now Madame was a Catholic; but her energies were swallowed up by the all-devouring daily exigencies of a great system. I spoke wonderingly of the matter to one who is thoroughly acquainted with the situation, and this is what was said to me: "Why, don't you know that they do not want logic? They do not wish to be hampered by the fetters of consistency."

We are, then, confronted by a great problem, the solution

of which is fearfully urgent. Sad though it be to make the avowal, the problem is instantly one of self-defence rather than of conquest. We are living in an atmosphere of poison. It has tainted press and law and politics, home and shop and society, business and amusement. In the ten years just gone by how many are the hundred thousands of those who should be our most sacred care, who have been put to breathe the deadly vapor at the brink of the very pools from which it rises? What then is to be done? And how is it to be done? And who is to do it? I have not come to solve a problem, but to state it; and to state it at the risk of being called an alarmist by some who might help towards the solution. What is to be done is, to fortify our own against the poison. And this is to be done by providing the safeguard. And it is to be done by those who have the responsibility. If any immunity is to be secured, it is to be secured by individual and concerted action according to the circumstances of localities. There are scattered individual workers who are striving nobly in narrow spheres; but how are we to get concerted action? Schools, school-books, teachers, companions, every grade of print—daily paper, magazine, history, general literature—and at the root "psychology," make up a battle-array with which it is necessary to enter into conflict. Wheresoever we do not see an open friend there we may suspect a secret enemy. The name "psychology" has been put into the curriculum in letters so large and so indelible that it were futile to attempt to rub it out. But if the label has to stand, the very least that might be done would be to make it stand for food and not for poison. It is not asking too much to demand that in our own schools the true psychology should be taught alongside of the new psychology. It should not be looking for too much to hope that a right-handed war might be waged upon vile text-books used in schools to which unwise and penny-wise parents will insist upon sending their children. What do we behold every day, those of us who have our eyes open? Youths, girls, children, young men at higher schools and lower schools, at colleges and schools of medicine, are placed

by fond fathers and mothers in the hands of materialistic professors, and they are mute in ignorance for an answer when challenged at the start as to the very existence of a spiritual soul distinct from matter. There was a time, which many of us remember, when girl graduates were supposed to be able to make flowers out of leather, and luscious wax cherries and watermelons which were preserved from dust and teeth by tall glass covers. Many of the old standard accomplishments have fallen into dishonor. Their place has been usurped by ever multiplying new ones. In those ancient days of wax and leather the graduate could spell correctly, pronounce correctly, read aloud intelligently, deliver a literary judgment based on sound principles, and write a very fine letter on paper which would be her social death to-day—for, to-day the paper is the thing. Much has disappeared with the glass covers. It is common for us, now, to hear our graduates loathing the imputation of having been taught to darn a heel or sew on a button, and this even amongst those whose purses are warrant that there is need of a great deal of darning. But now they have learned that they have a stomach and a liver ; yet they do not take any better care of either, though they may come out of school stout materialists, ardent Malthusians in principle, and whatever they please in practice.

What else can we expect ? Will we cast children into the fiery furnace every morning and think that they will come back to us every evening as sound as the boys of Babylon ? Will we toss them into the waves twice a day in the hope that they will walk every time like Peter ? The boys did not make a permanent play-house of the furnace ; and Peter did not go about giving exhibitions on the water. The whole army of materialists, whatsoever be their individual *aliases*, reject precisely the spiritual subject which is the *sine qua non* and the basis of all discussion in the true psychology. They will use the name psychology, but only to register under it a denial of what the name imports in its etymological derivation which has the sanction of history, philosophy and humanity. Sifted to the last, the sum of all their opposition

may be formulated as follows: "We have examined every atom of the human body; we have classified all the operations of the human organism; we have used all the means which human science has put at our disposal in the laboratory and the dissecting room; and we have failed to find a thing which could be called a spiritual soul. Hence we are justified in holding that the affirmation of a spiritual soul is utterly groundless." It is not always thought prudent to say precisely this, and in just so many words; but the ultimate goal of the great propagandism is always to make souls cast aside the truth of their own spirituality and immortality and responsibility, as antiquated mythological dogma built upon unscientific metaphysical abstractions.

Indeed, the men who have usurped the name, psychology, to label therewith all their experimentations upon the material human organism, have seemed to find their most effective weapon against the true psychology in the taunt, that all this metaphysics of the soul is the speculation of minds which are unaccustomed to, unacquainted with physiological and biological research, and are hence incapable of passing any sentence that might be deemed worthy of consideration in the advanced state of physical and experimental science. The metaphysician is thus dismissed with a word of pity. The untutored, the unwary, the thoughtless are caught in the snare; and the metaphysician is smiled at as a harmless dreamer.

The strength of this attack upon the higher and true psychology lies in two positions deftly taken. The first position is, that the spiritual, supra-sensitive soul has not been found with test-tube, balance, microscope or scalpel. The second position is, that those who assert such supra-sensitive soul are not given to the use of the instruments demanded for the investigation of matter, and are, therefore, not worthy of a hearing. What are we to say? Keeping in mind what has already been noted, we may reply: "Yes, you have used all the means at your disposal, with one very remarkable exception: you have failed to use your reason. You have been so engrossed in obtaining ocular testimony to

the results of the application of outside instruments to the human body that you have entirely overlooked the application of your intellect to the inner testimony of your own conscious self." The weakness and presumption of the first position must always be declared boldly and at the beginning by the enunciation of this truth, that all the material instruments known and unknown, and all the sensible observation possible, are inadequate to the work proposed, are utterly of no avail unless their revelations be supplemented by the use of reason.

The second position is, consequently, untenable. Moreover, as they must confess, it leaves the mere material experimenters fully as vulnerable as they would make us out to be. And we do not hesitate to say, that any *sincere*, *intelligent* investigator, if put to an alternative in the choice of means, the alternative of selecting certain multiplied physical appliances on the one hand, or, on the other, of electing his reason with the full testimony of consciousness and the broad humanity that moves unmagnified before his eyes, would undoubtedly prefer the latter. But this second position, that the metaphysician is not usually an expert in the use of physical instruments is, moreover, extremely ill taken, and when put to the test, when put under the fire of straightforward question, betrays its narrowness and isolation. For, how much personal investigation of the material world, including the human body, is really necessary before we may be allowed to indulge in the luxury of using our reason upon the facts? Let us suppose, for example, that you are an intelligent man ; that, by careful reading, you have made yourself well acquainted with the progress of many physical sciences, with their methods, their facts and their legitimate conclusions ; and that you have found time to make yourself so acquainted, because you did not bind yourself down to personal experiments within the hollow of a single groove. Now, with this preparation, be it that you wish to draw some conclusions, taking for your premises certain invariable principles and, we shall say, the known laws of cohesion, affinity and gravitation. Or, rather, let it be that you wish

to apply the rational test to certain affirmations which have been widely accepted as conclusions. What would you think if, after having discovered that the "conclusions" were arbitrary assumptions without foundation, you should be told that your argumentation was of no value because you had not passed your life with your eye over a microscope? Yet in this single illustration you have the full significance and rational value of all the taunts that the metaphysician is obliged to submit to; you have the entire argumentative worth of so many astounding "scientific demonstrations" that carry the popular audience. Unfortunately, the so-called "popular" mind is against the philosopher, very much as the shiftless liver is against the man of method. In what is called a "popular" audience three-fourths of the auditors are ready for any "conclusion" the lecturer wishes to "draw." There is no fixed truth anywhere along the line from medicine to common-law which the three-fourths will not think themselves privileged to doubt, if only the lecturer says it is doubtful and says so with a "therefore" after a hundred marvelous electrical and chemical experiments abounding in explosions and blue sparks and in many colored bottles whose glistening splendor would dim the glory of any drug store window.

The metaphysician, the philosopher, claims the privilege which cannot be denied him, the privilege of arguing upon the basis of ascertained physical law and *a priori* principle. He claims the privilege of working forward upon the reliable experience of others. His work lies in the coördinating of metaphysical principles and physical laws, with the view of discovering further consequences that cannot be laid bare by the fusing and weighing and dissolving of matter, which cannot be reached by the mere instrumentality of microscope or telescope. He works forward upon known facts and invariable principles with the view of discovering other supra-sensible facts which do not appeal to sense but which can present themselves with their evidence to the supra-sensitive power of intellect. We would not deny the existence of light because it does not appeal to the ear; nor the existence

of odor, because it does not appeal to the eye. Neither may we deny the existence of supra-sensible facts, truths, principles, conclusions, just because they are supra-sensible and appeal not to sense but to reason.

The metaphysician accepts all facts, ascertained facts; all laws, ascertained laws. But he must refuse to take conjecture for fact, or to reason upon theory as though it were law. The facts and laws of physical science he can accept unhesitatingly on the testimony of persons whom he justly regards as authorities in their own departments. He can read their books, and recognize the correctness of their conclusions, without applying himself to the certification of the facts by experimental tests. Yet, with all this, he does not feel himself called upon to take up or pursue, or to accept until it is proven wrong, every new theory of every experimenter. The theories that have withstood the cumulative opposition of the same physical facts they were intended to explain are very very few. To launch a dim theory the certification of which will require experimentation upon the border-land of everything past, present and future; to hang up a great sign, "Hands off the theory until the facts are in;" then to go on building up columns of facts, pertinent and impertinent, *ad indefinitum;* to secure immunity, moreover, and prestige by adding the the alphabet to one's name; and finally to bequeath to posterity a theory the mention of which will be a pass-word into fame for all who choose to go forth with pick and spade and mallet to quarry out some facts from the untold æons;—all this, we confess it, may be simpler far and more enticing than to be tied down to the prosaic toil of reasoning upon the facts that are and the principles that must be.

We have, then, a very immediate need in our education of attention to the fact of the spiritual soul. Nor will the fact be difficult of presentation except in that it will demand precisely that concentration of mind, that effort at thought which actual methods of stringing individual facts unfit the mind for, and consequently render arduous. Before and after and in the midst of the experiments the student can be brought to recognize the serious questions that are involved

in the true psychology. He will soon form a new and higher appreciation of the true science. He will see how different it is from the "psychology" that fills the schools and is occupied with the observation and classification of nervous and muscular movement as connected with the states of consciousness. He will see how wide the latter misnamed psychology with its heaps of material facts aims of the grave issues with which it behooves man to make himself acquainted. When he has clearly before him the true scope of psychology in the legitimate sense of the name, then only will he be able to determine how much of the mass of sensible facts presented by physical experimenters may be of any service to him towards formulating conclusions in the higher and genuine sphere of the science. It is important for him to learn early how the theory of monistic, materialistic evolution not only contradicts the invariable laws of correct thought but how it contradicts those very laws of matter on which so much stress is laid. We are told that the laws of matter as it composes the visible universe to-day are to be taken as the shibboleths by which the intelligence and acquirements of the generations of to-day are to be tested, and yet when we challenge the new teachers to complete the scheme of the visible universe by asserting these laws for the primal eras, we are told that these laws must be rejected for those other days, because the admission of their activity at the first assumed stages would lead us to the confession of an eternal intelligent God and of an immortal spiritual soul,—and these two assumptions with all their terminology have been ruled out of the operations of the scientific exchange.

We may do much to save our own; but the restoration of the science to the plane of dignity which it should occupy in the public estimation is a task from which we may very well shrink. The world at large is itching to-day as it never did before, ever for something new. It is manifesting a downright hatred for fixed principles. It is ready and anxious to throw away any truth which has come to be called old. It stands alert to grasp at any flying theory that is winged with novelty. It counts him a very poor specula-

tor in the babel of science who will hesitate to seize upon any glittering assumption which is presented as a rigid conclusion drawn from facts that are not to be found. Looking out over the wide arena of restless talk in the midst of which we find ourselves, and listening to the ceaseless clatter of tongues proclaiming here a fact and there a fact to be pooled into the theories that are announced in haughty, overbearing, contemptuous language, with every parade of self-sufficiency and all-sufficiency, with sneers at the intelligence of the past and with prophetic forecast of the treasures of revolutionizing truths that are to be unlocked in the future, we feel that our voices would be unheard in the wild clamor, and that, beyond saving ourselves, there is nothing for us to do but to close our lips in the universal din and wait in patience for the sane judgment which the future will pass upon our days.

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THE TRANSFIGURATION OF OUR LORD.[1]

THE Transfiguration is intimately connected, in the synoptic account of the Gospels, with the announcement of the Passion and that of the glorious *Parousia.* It contrasts with the former and preludes the latter, crowning the Galilean ministry now near to its end, with a halo of brilliance made of the calm prevision of the dark days that were about to begin and the dazzling hopes of the future triumph. It marks the instant when Jesus, after the rather saddening experience of His preaching, shows His

1 Matt. xvi^i., 1–13. Mark ix., 1–12. Luke ix., 28–36.

soul filled with the thought of His necessary death, and prepares Himself to accomplish the supreme act of His divine programme, "to lose His life in order to save it," to enter through death into eternal glory, to insure the future welfare of His work, the salvation of the world, the complete coming of the Kingdom of God, by the sacrifice of His life to the will of the Father in Heaven.

In the Messianic career of Jesus, the Transfiguration marks a solemn turning-point, like the baptism and the temptation.[1] At the baptism the Messianic consecration, in the desert the deep intuition of the aim to be attained and stumbling blocks to be avoided, on the Mount of the Transfiguration the full consciousness of the approaching sacrifice and the firm resolution of accepting it and at the same time the certitude of the triumph to be secured by this sacrifice. The deep psychological meaning of these three turning-points, if we may say so on such a subject, made them to some extent inexpressible in the language of men. Hence come the difficulties which arise in the evangelical narratives where an attempt has been made to describe them. But these difficulties bear only on the external details of the facts; they do not affect the substance nor do they cloud in any way the luminous teaching which they contain.

Six days after the confession of Peter and the incidents or the instructions connected with it,[2] Jesus took with Him the three of His disciples who were most closely linked to Him in heart and thought, Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, James and John. The precision of the date is certainly intended to express the intimate connection which exists, as well from a real and historical as from an ideal and logical standpoint, between the Transfiguration and the first mention of Our Saviour's death. St. Luke says "about eight days" instead of "six days." We can hardly say that such a vague indication is a deliberate correction of the one given by the other two Synoptics, as if the Evangelist designed to include

1 Schanz, Markus, 286.

2 Matt. xvi, 13-28; Mark viii., 27, ix., 1; Luke ix., 18-27.

in his reckoning with the interval of six days, both the day which preceded them, on which the confession of Peter took place, and the day which followed them, the day of the Transfiguration. It is much more probable that St. Luke derived this information from another source, or that he simply reproduced with more or less accuracy the indication of St. Mark. Jesus brought the three chosen ones up "unto a high mountain;" St. Luke says simply "the mountain." According to the third Gospel it would seem that the scene of the Transfiguration was in Galilee on the mountain where Our Lord selected His Apostles.[1] The circumstances of the prayer which the Evangelist emphasizes and of the night spent on the mountain, establish between the two situations a perfect analogy. In St. Matthew the "high mountain" recalls that of the temptation.[2] But this time Jesus is no longer on the height, beset by the image of earthly glories; He is there now absorbed in the thought of His coming death; and in the anticipatory splendor of His eternal triumph. To judge from the immediate context, according to both St. Matthew and St. Mark, the mountain of the Transfiguration should be sought for in the neighborhood of Cæsarea which our Lord is supposed to have left only later on.[3]

St. Matthew does not mention expressly the return to Galilee, and one might suppose he did that on purpose because he did not want to determine the site of the mountain, or at least to locate it in a pagan country. But the indications of St. Mark are very precise. If we ought to consider as historical and not merely didactic the connection of facts in the second Gospel, the scene of the Transfiguration has to be located on some peak of the Hermon range to the south of Cæsarea.

According to an old tradition going back at least to the time of Origen[4] and for a long while favorably received in

1 St. Luke vi., 12. 2 Matt. iv., 8.

3 St. Mark ix., 30, and viii., 27; Matt. xvi., 13, and xvii., 22.

4 In Ps. lxxxix., 13; Migne, Patr. gr. 12, 1547.

the Church, the scene of the Transfiguration was Mount Tabor. It is well known that in the *Gospel to the Hebrews*, Tabor was the mountain of the Temptation, and very likely there is in St. Matthew some relation between these two mountains. It might be said that the account of the Transfiguration is connected not so much with the confession of St. Peter as with the prediction of the Passion. It is not sure that the facts are arranged in that passage of St. Mark according to their real, rather than in a didactic order. It might be that in the primitive Gospel the narrative of the Transfiguration was not so intimately connected with the journey to Cæsarea. But these probabilities are not sufficient to give an incontestable basis to the tradition concerning Tabor. It were better to follow the line traced by St. Mark, noting however that the commentator may and ought to abstain from absolute conclusions on a point which is completely omitted in the documents. Since the Evangelists did not designate by its name and its geographical location the mountain of the Transfiguration, very rash would be the exegetist to think that he could complete their information.

Whilst Jesus was with the three disciples on the mountain He appeared transformed, His face shining with such brilliance that it could be compared to that of the sun on which our eye cannot gaze; His garments white as the dazzling snow. St. Mark and St. Matthew say nothing about the precise moment of this marvelous transfiguration ; St. Luke implies that it was at night.[1] A solitary mountain top, silence and darkness are just the proper setting for this glorious manifestation. The disciples were gazing on Jesus and the glory of His future coming. Beside Him, in the same flood of glory, glistening with a divine radiance, were two men, Moses and Elias, speaking with Our Lord. The most illustrious representatives of the Old Testament adored the Son of Man ; the Law and the prophets paid their homage to the New Covenant. Jesus, Moses, Elias spake together of the death which the Messiah had to suffer at Jerusalem. Sublime interview!

1 St. Luke ix., 37, and vi., 12 ; xxii., 45.

The idea alone overwhelms our minds, astonished as we are to hear revealed in four words the whole plan of Providence for the salvation of human-kind.

Moses had alluded to the Messias;[1] Elias was to be his forerunner.[2] It was believed even that both of them would reappear together immediately before the last judgment and the manifestation of the Kingdom of God.[3] That belief is easily accounted for by the fact that Jewish tradition represented Elias as not having known death and Moses himself as being buried not on earth but in Heaven.[4] They are probably the two witnesses spoken of in the Apocalypse, who in the last days of the world will be killed by the beast and then rise from the dead. They stand here as witnesses of the fulfillment of prophecy in Jesus, in Jesus indeed suffering and dying, before they give testimony to His glorious advent. Their very presence in the company of the now glorified Saviour preludes their final reappearance and insures the triumph after sorrow and death. This presence is highly significant in itself at the moment when Jesus shows Himself ready to enter upon His *rôle* as the suffering Messias. This is the reason why St. Mark and St. Matthew do not otherwise indicate the object of their conversation with Our Saviour. St. Luke did express it in formal terms either as a kind of compensation for having passed over in silence both the question asked by the disciples about Elias when descending from the mountain and the answer when Jesus declares that His Passion had been announced by the prophets, either because he found an indication in the oral tradition, or in the primitive Gospel.[5] The same evangelist points out a trait which is found again in the history of Our Saviour's agony at Gethsemane, where the three chosen ones accompanied their Master. Peter, James and John were

1 Messianic interpretation of Deut. xviii., 15.

2 According to Malach. iii., 1. 3 Apoc. xi., 2–3.

4 A tradition connected with Deut. xxxiv., 6.

5 II. Pet. i., 15–18, where the same word ἔξοδος is employed, v. 15, and notice that this Epistle does not seem to be dependent at all on St. Luke.

weary and oppressed with sleep; yet they struggled against it whilst Jesus was praying, and so they could see the Transfiguration of Jesus and the appearance of Moses and Elias. Perhaps St. Luke meant to say that the apostles yielded to their need of sleep during the prayer of Jesus, and that when they awoke from their slumber their eyes opened upon the spectacle just described.[1] At least, the apostles are supposed to be in a state of semi-stupor from which they are aroused by the dazzling rays. This descriptive trait which visibly contrasts with the narrative common to the three synoptics shows that St. Luke pictured to himself the scene of the Transfiguration in a manner analogous to that of the Agony, and that he was thinking of the latter when sketching the former. Such a *rapprochement* ought not to be a matter of surprise: the Agony is the last great act which precedes the catastrophe; it is a natural sequel to the Temptation and the Transfiguration, relating to and completing both of them, being in its symbolic reality the supreme victory over the last and most frightful of all temptations, as well as the definite acceptation of the approaching sacrifice which was to produce immediately immense and eternal results.

According to the spirit of the narration we have to suppose that Moses and Elias appeared to the apostles with the characteristic features under which they used to picture them from the narratives of the Old Testament. And now occurs to St. Peter the idea of affording a shelter to the divine Master and His two heavenly visitants: "We are here very opportunely," he says to Jesus, "to make three tents, one for Thee, one for Moses and one for Elias." The common interpretation "We are well here" seems to be less natural in the circumstances in which St. Peter does not desire to show how deeply interested he is in the spectacle, but rather his readiness to help the heavenly visitants. He does not say "It is good for us to *remain* here" but: "It is good for us to *be* here" for the reason which he

1 It seems that the Greek word διαγρεγορήσαντες can be interpreted in this sense.

adds immediately. The idea of Peter has seemed as strange to the Evangelists as it may seem to us. St. Mark insinuates that it happened to strike the Apostle who expressed it without any further reflection, seized by terror as he and his two companions were. St. Luke gives a more complete explanation. Seeing that Moses and Elias were about to part from Jesus, Peter would delay their presence on the mountain. Still, the proposal remains strange, and St. Luke also says, after St. Mark, that Peter was not knowing what he said. Perhaps it is by anticipation that St. Mark has described them as struck with fear. In the other two synoptists the apostles are not afraid until a radiant cloud encircles them and the voice of God is heard. The exclamation of Peter would be rather one of joy and might perhaps imply the afterthought of keeping Moses and Elias to fulfill the ministry for which they would be commissioned at the end of the world. The evangelists seem to conceive the duration of the appearance as rather short. St. Matthew and St. Mark describe it as a kind of swift vision which gives occasion to the dreamy words of Peter and is then almost suddenly overshadowed by the cloud. Peter does not receive any answer. A cloud enwraps the three heavenly figures, taking them away from the sight of the disciples who remain outside of the cloud and therefore were not, we should suppose, very near to Jesus. The words of Peter have been uttered without interrupting the conversation of the Messias with His witnesses. Whatever the disciples may say or do does not prevent the divine manifestation from going on and being completed before them. In the Old Testament when God wants to address men He hides Himself in a cloud. So Moses had to enter into the midst of the cloud to talk face to face with the Lord.[1] It is the same here; the majesty of God is present in the cloud which deprives the apostles of the supernatural vision. The Heavenly Father's voice is heard: "This is My beloved Son; hear ye Him;" according to St. Matthew, "My beloved Son in whom I am well pleased;" according to St. Luke, "My chosen Son." The

1 Ex. xxiv., 18; xxxiii. 9-11; Job, xxxviii., 1.

word "chosen" is employed as a Messianic title in the book of Henoch. But perhaps the readings "chosen" and "beloved" should be considered as different translations of the same word of the Hebrew Gospel.[1] Moses and Elias have been the interpreters of the Divine Will; but the Law and the prophets existed only in view of Jesus. It is Jesus who is to be hereafter guide and Master. The Old Testament gives testimony of Him; but He, Himself, is greater than Moses, greater than Elias; He is the Christ, Son of God, declared such by His Father. To Him is due the obedience of men. The word which Jesus heard on the day of His baptism is heard now by those whom He chose as His auxiliaries; it will be heard in every age to come.

The apostles are bewildered with fear, according to St. Luke, when the cloud appears; according to St. Matthew, only after they hear the voice. The last indication is doubtless more in conformity with the primitive Gospel. Besides, the cloud and the Heavenly Voice were almost simultaneous. The voice of God falls like a thunder-bolt on the heads of the disciples, seized by terror. All is done in an instant. The voice is silent. The disciples recover somewhat from their terrors, raise their eyes and gaze around: the cloud has vanished; Moses and Elias have disappeared. Jesus alone is with them, just as he was before the miracle which seemed to them as if it were a dream. St. Matthew remarks that the disciples, hearing the voice of God, had fallen prostrate, and that Jesus had come to them and touched them, saying: "Arise, be not afraid." A similar trait is found twice in the book of Daniel,[2] and once in the Apocalypse.[3] The narrative of the Transfiguration is to some extent an apocalyptic scene, analogous to those related in the book just quoted. The reality is full of symbols, and everything happens between heaven and earth, on the point

1 For instance בחיר. A. Resch, *Aussercanonische Paralleltexte zu den Evangelien*, iii., 164, cf. Is. xlii., 1., (Hebrew and Septuagint) and Matt. xii, 18.

2 Dan. viii., 17-18; x., 7-10, 16-18. 3 Apoc. i., 17.

where experimental knowledge borders on vision, if it does not altogether give it its place. St. Luke says that the three apostles "told no man in those days of these things which they had seen." This remark is parallel to what is said in the first two Gospels that Jesus charged them to tell no man until the Son of Man was risen from the dead. The prohibition is expressed almost in the same way in St. Matthew and St. Mark. Jesus made it on the way down the mountain. St. Mark adds that the disciples "kept the word to themselves," that is to say, they observed the prescription of Our Saviour, so that nobody, before the Resurrection of Jesus, heard anything about the Transfiguration. The deep meaning of the latter could not be grasped before Jesus would die and rise from the dead. The three disciples were nevertheless perplexed about the term fixed to their silence; they were questioning what the word "resurrection" could possibly mean in the case of Jesus. They had the general idea of the resurrection of the dead, but did not yet understand that Christ had to die; consequently they could not see how He could rise from the dead. Their minds being troubled about the possible circumstances of the last advent, they asked a question of Jesus about Elias. One would say that they hoped to receive the solution of the question which troubles them in the answer to another difficulty which they know is somewhat connected with the same object. The question, in the Gospel of St. Mark, is introduced by the indirect interrogative: "The scribes say that Elias must come first!" But the question is easily implied, and corresponds to the direct interrogation of St. Matthew: "Why then do the scribes say that Elias must come first?" It is not very easy to see in what the difficulty of the apostles does consist. Has it a direct relation with the scene of the Transfiguration, or is it simply connected with the idea of the great Messianic advent which they supposed to be near? If there is any allusion to the recent appearance of Elias do the disciples estimate this visit too late because they believe that the kingdom of God began with the preaching of the Gospel, or too transient, because Elias parted without fulfilling the functions attributed

to him in the preparation of the glorious kingdom? It seems that the Gospel text connects the question of the disciples rather with the appearance just described; but on the other hand, the disciples, owing to their state of mind, could hardly think of any other than the glorious advent. They know that the end is near, and yet Elias does not come to fulfill his *rôle*. He has appeared just for one instant, and then departed. Therefore he will not do what the Scribes say, quoting from Malachi.

The answer of Jesus leads to a broader as well as to a more spiritual and real idea of the kingdom of God. The *rôle* of Elias is exactly what the Scribes say, to restore all things for the last judgment. Elias has come; but the bad dispositions of men did not enable him to fulfill entirely the mission which the prophets assigned to him. Instead of hearing him and doing penance "they have done unto him whatsoever they had in mind." So it is with the advent of the Messias which cannot be now in glory, but must needs be for a time in suffering and death. This was predicted likewise by the prophets and the fate of Elias had been foreseen. Since our Lord speaks of John the Baptist—another Elias,—he alludes to the persecutions directed against Elias which were a type of the Precursor's fate.[1] The teaching contained in the answer of Jesus is precisely that which is brought out by the whole narrative of the Transfiguration.

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1 Schanz, Markus, 292.

THE RELATIONS OF THE PASTOR TO THE SUNDAY SCHOOL.

In speaking of "the Pastor," throughout this article, I have mainly in view the rectors of large congregations, who have assistant priests associated with them in the government of the flock. It is as referring to such conditions in general that I venture to make the following suggestions as reasonable, useful and, in a measure, necessary requisites to the successful operation of a Sunday school.

LOVE.

It goes without saying that the Christian education of the children should and must be one of the paramount objects of the pastor's life, something he loves as the apple of his eye, an integral and an essential portion of his ministry. This love is needed much more for children who are in Sunday school than for those who attend Catholic day schools, because of the very difficulties that surround the training of those whose instruction is restricted to one day in the week.

GOVERNMENT.

Per se, the pastor should not be the immediate director of the Sunday school. The reasons are these: (*a*) His attention is too much divided by the various cares of the parish, and his time is too much occupied to permit the concentration of mind which this work necessarily calls for. (*b*) He loses in both influence and authority when he is supposed to be responsible for all the details, and to take part in settling the ordinary school difficulties. It is much better that he should be a high court of appeal, whose smile will be a great reward, and whose frown will be something that the children would think it a disgrace to have merited. (*c*) The children are not benefited by being aware that their pastor knows all their shortcomings. (*d*) A reproof from the pastor, no matter how mildly it may be worded, seems to always have about it something severe and wounding; consequently, when he occupies the position of immediate Spiritual Director, he is

obliged either to approve many evils, or to cause bruised and hurt feelings to very many.

I have said that *per se* the pastor should not be immediate head of the Sunday school. But it can happen that no other course will be found advisable. He may have no assistant who loves the work, or who has ability for it, whereas his own aptitude may be extraordinary. In such a case it is by all means desirable that he take the place himself. But he will find it worth his while to train an assistant to the work as soon as he can. It will save him a great deal of drudgery, and the results are likely to be larger.

VISITS.

Nevertheless, the pastor should be identified with the work of the Sunday school. There is no need that he be present at every session, nor at the whole of any session; but he should visit the school personally at least every two or three weeks, if only for a few moments, to prove his deep interest in all the work that is being done. He should also make a special point of attending the various entertainments, the closing exercises, and sometimes at least, the reading of the reports.

ENCOURAGEMENT.

The effect of intelligent encouragement is wonderful. We all stand in need of it, whether we be spiritual directors, superintendents, teachers or pupils. A word or a smile will often be sufficient. But it is a great mistake to omit these helps. Good work should receive its proper meed of commendation and reward. Little favors, medals, premium books, and once in a while, excursions are very useful.

PROVIDING SUITABLE ACCOMMODATIONS.

The room or rooms in which the Sunday school session is held should be well ventilated, lighted, heated and furnished. Everything that makes the school room comfortable and beautiful helps the work along. When possible, it is well to

have the classes divided from each other, but unfortunately this is rarely among the things that can be.

EXPENDITURE.

The pastor should be willing to spend a reasonable amount of money for the Sunday school. All needless expenses should of course be avoided, but the work cannot be done well when performed in a parsimonious spirit. It is hard to see how the best results can be obtained unless the catechisms and other books be given free. There is something, certainly, in the objection that what people get cheaply they are liable to hold cheaply. But the custom of our day is to make general education as cheap as air or water. It looks like good policy, to say the least, to put no embargo, no prohibitory tariff, upon religious instruction. The books in the Public Schools are free, and also those in our best Catholic day schools. Besides, the expense of providing catechisms is as a rule very small.

Should teachers be paid? The answer to this question is that everything should be done that is necessary to secure efficient work. In cases where there is a Spiritual Director who is a thorough pedagogue, and who has at his command superintendents capable and energetic, there seems no good reason for paying any one. But if these be not at hand, it seems foolish to hesitate about paying a small salary when there is question of getting good talent. What can be important? Keeping shingles on the roof? Even this is not as essential as keeping the faith alive among Catholics. And religious instruction is the most fruitful of all means to this end.

REPORTS.

The pastor should insist upon getting, regularly, detailed reports of the progress of the Sunday school. Three such manifests in the year will not be too many. They should touch the total register, the average attendance, the age of the children, the aggregate number of lessons

known and missed, the number who have left, and the reasons therefor; the number of teachers and of teachers' meetings; the progress made by each grade during the term; an estimate of how many children in the parish are neglected as far as their religious instruction is concerned, and also suggestions regarding ways and means of improvement. These reports are of great value. In fact all constant progress depends upon them. They fix responsibility. And responsibility is the most powerful of all stimulants. They show clearly whether or not the proper work is being done and with what success. The examination of conscience is not a more powerful means for personal improvement, than is this making of reports for improving Sunday school work. Besides, the report supplies an excellent basis of communication regarding affairs of the Sunday school between the pastor and the Spiritual Director. Without it they cannot know each other's mind on various points. This habit of making reports is not suggested for the purpose of giving the pastor any extra domination over his assistant. It would be well if the pastor, in his turn, were obliged to make a report to a Diocesan Board, which, with its inspectors, would have the authority and the duty to report upon and compare all the schools of Christian Doctrine.

EXHORTATION.

The duty of the parents with regard to their children's religious instruction should be a frequent theme of the pastor's sermons and addresses to the people. Fathers and mothers should be taught to send the children in time, to make sure that the lessons are prepared, to look upon the missing of the catechism lesson as the most injurious of all failures. Special insistence should be made on the point of the children remaining at the Sunday school for a good while after their First Communion and Confirmation. There would be little difficulty in creating a public opinion that would keep practically every boy and girl under religious instruction until the age of seventeen years has been attained.

PEDAGOGY.

Even though the pastor be not obliged to act as Spiritual Director of the Sunday school, it is of much advantage if he have an intelligent idea of all the details which render the instruction and management of the school efficient. The reading of educational works, papers and magazines, is of great assistance in this respect. They often contain much chaff; but there is a good deal of wheat in them also. And if they did nothing more than keep the mind intent upon educational subjects, they would render assistance that is invaluable.

These are the principal aids the pastor of a large parish can render his Sunday school. At another time I hope to say something of the office of the Spiritual Director in the work of the Sunday school.

M. J. LAVELLE.

New York.

DR. WHITE'S EVOLUTION: THE GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF HIS LEGEND.[1]

WE have observed before that the gentleman, whose creation in the literary and historical world we have been considering, and that with emotions of astonishment, if not of admiration, is in every sense of the term an evolutionist. He is so pronounced in this order of development, that, not only himself, but everything which comes near him, has to undergo the process of evolution, however remote it may have been before from enduring that painful operation. Miracles have been made an evolutionary product of imagination; and the great sample of modern times, presented in the life of St. Francis Xavier, has shared the common lot.

But here a strange phenomenon arrests our vision. It is that the gentleman himself, while treating this precise topic, does not evolve beyond his original texts. He has deteriorated considerably; not only in other parts and proofs since his former edition; but notably in the great positive proof, extracted by Dr. Douglas a century ago from the pages of Joseph Acosta. Dr. Douglas, the Protestant Bishop of Salisbury, the Rev. Le Mesurier, Hugh Farmer, Peter Roberts, down to the Rev. Mr. Greer, vicar of Templebodane and chaplain to Earl Talbot the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, had left the proof from Acosta in a much better condition than we found it to be in with Dr. White, before we paid our last compliments to the rudimentary creature.

With Dr. Douglas the fable stood thus: He would adduce "conclusive evidence that, during thirty-five years from the death of Xavier, his miracles had not been heard of. The evidence I shall allege," said he, "is that of Acosta, who himself had been a missionary among the Indians. His work, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute* was printed in 1589—

1 See the July number, p. 42, "Dr. A. D. White's Legend about St. Francis Xavier."

that is, above thirty-seven years after the death of Xavier; and in it we find an express acknowledgment that no miracles had ever been performed by missionaries among the Indians. Acosta was himself a Jesuit, and therefore from his silence we may infer, unexceptionably, that between thirty and forty years had elapsed before Xavier's miracles were thought of."[1]

At first blush it might appear that Dr. White does not deteriorate notably from his original. He too accepts of the Protestant theologian's logic so far as to consider "silence" an "express acknowledgment." Dr. White is even more forcible just here, and with reason. He thought that a general question about the rarity of miracles in modern times authorized him to apply the very expressive terms, "positive evidence—direct testimony" to the proof from Acosta. Here there is no deterioration, either in the affirmation which is rather an improvement, or in the logic, which is on a par. Nor again was there any deterioration in assuming that, if one man was silent about miracles, therefore no miracles had ever been wrought; nor finally in suppressing texts and falsifying Acosta generally. So far there is no degeneration in Dr. White; no devolution; none of what evolutionists call Catagenesis. He is equal to his ancestor of a hundred years ago.

But in other respects he degenerates marvelously. Dr. Douglas had said: "No miracle heard of during thirty-five years;" Dr. White drops down unconscionably to nineteen years, to four years, to two years, to no years at all. Dr. Douglas had it: "No miracle;" Dr. White has it: "Quite a number." If we had the ear of Professor Cope just for five minutes, we would urge on him strongly the propriety of substituting this live instance of catagenesis for his old fossils of the rudimentary teeth of the fœtal whale, and the legs with which the boa cannot run away, and the wings with which the ostrich cannot fly. Here we have rudiments running down visibly before our eyes.

1 Quoted by us in the *Catholic World*, Oct. 1891, p. 22.

§ 1.

Says Dr. White: "Two or three things occurred" during Xavier's life; and he goes on: "For example." Then he gives three occurrences as examples. There are more than three, even in Dr. White's opinion; because these three are given only by way of "example." Since he wrote his first edition, he has found out even more. For then, when he came to the third, he put down "finally." There was no harm in that; it was the last example he meant to adduce; so without prejudice he might say "finally." But he thought prudence the better part of valor; and, to be quite safe from the side of any punctilious critic, he changed "finally" into a safer word: "Again." From this we infer that he had more "examples;" and still more facts.[1]

So he had. It appears that he finds Melchior Nuñez, Provincial of the Jesuits in the Portuguese dominions of Asia, reporting three, only two years after Xavier's death. It appears that De Quadros, Provincial of the Jesuits in the distant country of Ethiopia, "had heard of nine miracles, and asserted that Xavier had healed the sick and cast out devils;" this was in 1555, only three years after Xavier's death. It appears that "the next year, being four years after Xavier's death, King John III. of Portugal, a very devout man, directed his viceroy Barreto to draw up and transmit to him an authentic account of Xavier's miracles, urging him to do the work 'with zeal and speedily.'" Again, only ten years after Xavier's death, "the Jesuit Almeida, writing at great length to his brethren," reports miracles through the relics of Xavier.[2] Nay, during all these ten years, he admits that, as he pleasantly expresses himself, "abundant legends had already begun to grow elsewhere."[3] All this evidently is within the term of those thirty-five years, during which Dr. Douglas had said, not a

1 Dr. A. D. White's "Warfare of Science with Theology," vol. ii., ch. xiii., pp. 6-7.

2 Ibid. p. 12.

3 Ibid. p. 9.

miracle was heard of. Dr. White is a little recalcitrant in the face of his master.

Nor is that all. He is more liberal still. As he harps upon "contemporary documents" so much, we are naturally inquisitive to learn what he means by the term "contemporary." And, upon examination, we are taken aback at the large margin he allows us. He grants that witnesses or documents will be contemporary if they fall within any of three meanings which he assigns to that word.

First, Xavier's own writings, or the letters of his associates, are contemporary. In this sense, the word or its equivalent figures some dozen times within a few pages,[1] as we observed before.

Secondly, he gives us the idea of contemporary in such a phrase as this: "[Xavier's] associates during his life or during several years after his death."[2] And again he says: "Until about ten years after Xavier's death," the letters of the missionaries continued; and he describes them as "men who were supposed to be in the very thick of these miraculous manifestations."[3] He even goes so far as to recognize in the same category those who were "immediate successors of Xavier;" for he speaks of "the missionaries who had been co-workers or immediate successors of Xavier in his Eastern field;"[4] and thus he brings in the Jesuit Almeida. More than that, he allows that a man, who had never been in the East, and who was writing "nineteen years after Xavier's death," could be not only contemporary, "but the highest contemporary authority on the whole subject;" for that is how he describes Joseph Acosta.[5]

Thirdly, he gives a still wider meaning to the idea of contemporary. He mentions as witnesses "the natives upon whom he [Xavier] had wrought his miracles," and he joins with them at once "their children and grand-children." This testimony of the natives, their children and grand-children, he considers so good, that he merely distinguishes it from any written testimony of theirs, which, he says, they

1 Ibid. pp. 6–9. 2 P. 8. 3 P. 9. 4 P. 12. 5 P. 9.

could not give; for "certainly the ignorant natives of India and Japan did not commit any account of his miracles to writing."[1] This may be true, and it may be false. But all that we take note of is, that the oral testimony of children and grand-children is grouped by him with that of the natives on whom Xavier wrought his miracles. As the witness of these natives is contemporary, so he implies that the witness of their children and grand-children is contemporary likewise.

Now, we are quite aware that the Doctor never meant all this. But we are grateful nevertheless. These admissions escaped him when he was trying to make a point against somebody or something. But, having escaped him, they are ours; and we are thankful all the same. We might just take occasion here to remind him that it is very necessary, for him especially, to have a good memory. Memory alone would not make up for logic; but his logic will never march at all without the support of a very tenacious memory.

Hard as this is on Dr. Douglas, it is harder still on Dr. White, as we shall now see.

§ 2.

We come to the legend. Its foundation is given in these precise terms: "No account of a miracle wrought by him [Xavier] appears either in his own letters or in any contemporary document."[2] A dozen times this statement, in whole or in part, comprehensive or particular, is repeated by the Doctor, to make sure the web and woof on which the legend must be woven.

But let us pause a moment. The Doctor himself gives us accounts of miracles from "contemporary documents," or else oral witnesses; and that in the three orders covered by the term, "contemporary." First, he gives three from Xavier himself, merely by way of "example." Secondly, he reports miracles from Nuñez, Deyro, Father Pablo de

1 P 17. 2 P. 6.

Santa Fé, De Quadros, Almeida. Thirdly, he observes that Barreto, viceroy of India, was engaged by the King of Portugal to draw up "authentic accounts;" and he seems to imply that Barreto gathered "treasures of grace." What becomes of the Doctor's thesis, that "no account of a miracle wrought by him appears either in his own letters or in any contemporary document?"

The valiant author is ready. That was no slip of his. He has a witness on the stand prompt to deny each and every miracle reported by no matter whom. That witness is himself. It is true that he, living in the nineteenth century, does not enter into any of the categories of "contemporary" with St. Francis Xavier. But that does not matter.

He delivers his documentary witness in this style: "Only the most earnest devotee could claim anything like divine interposition" in the three examples derived from Xavier's own account. "They were few and feeble." "These were entirely from hearsay." "It was reported vaguely." They were "abundant legends." It was "an afterthought." It was "a subsidiary legend." As to John Deyro, who "said he knew that Xavier had the gift of prophecy," this man "Xavier himself had reprimanded and cast off for untruthfulness and dishonesty." A capital witness that, we should have thought; still not so good, it appears, as the Doctor himself! With regard to Barreto's official reports, the Doctor's own contemporary evidence despatches all of them, before they have time to get into writing: "We may well imagine," he says, with his usual imaginativeness, "what treasures of grace an obsequious viceroy, only too anxious to please a devout king, could bring together by means of the hearsay of ignorant, compliant natives through all the little towns of Portuguese India." This is very severe on little towns. Maybe the witness in a big town, like New York, would always be much more unimpeachably true! In short, it was all "thought of little value by those best able to judge."[1] So, too, has thought the Doctor; and he is emi-

1 Pages 6, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18.

nently able to judge. And Emanuel Acosta only wrote his commentaries "as an afterthought, nearly twenty years after Xavier's death!" Exactly; the Doctor is writing his commentaries, as an afterthought, nearly 350 years after those events.

We will submit it to the reader whether we were justified, on a former occasion, in stigmatizing the assumption which underlies all this, by saying, in face of the Doctor's refusal to accept sworn witnesses: "This will be quite consistent with the rest of his demonstration, and with the original assumption underlying all, which is that we are, on no account, to demur to his own testimony, albeit he is not a witness, nor is he sworn to deliver the truth."

Thus then the Doctor has rebutted, with his own testimony, the witness of all the world. That is not all. He has another witness—the Roman Catholic Church. This is startling. Yet the gentleman has his witness ready; and he produces it.

"In 1562, Julius Gabriel Eugubinus delivered a solemn oration on the condition and glory of the Church, before the papal legates and other fathers assembled at the Council of Trent;" but, "while he alluded to a multitude of things," he made not the remotest allusion to St. Francis Xavier's miracles. More than that: Julius Gabriel Eugubinus wrote letters to the foremost of the fathers assembled at Trent; and he says not a word about St. Francis Xavier's miracles. Worse still: "We have also a multitude of letters written from the Council by Bishops, Cardinals, and even by the Pope himself, discussing all sorts of Church affairs, and in not one of these is there evidence of the remotest suspicion that any of these reports, which they must have heard, regarding Xavier's miracles, were worthy of mention."[1] This is getting serious; for, of course, the Council of Trent was like the office of an editor, who is receiving his telegrams and sending them down post-haste to the compositor for the earliest morning edition of the daily paper on the glories of the

1 P. 13.

Church! But the Doctor has not finished. He charges right into the thick of the enemy, and says that Julius Gabriel Eugubinus "gives a Latin translation of a letter, 'on religious affairs in the Indies,' written by a Jesuit father twenty years after Xavier's death," "from a field very distant from that in which Xavier labored;" yet no "allusion appears" to the miracles wrought by Xavier—and this from a Jesuit father! All this he proves in a note, full of gravity: "For the work referred to, see *Julii Gabrielii* [sic] *Eugubini orationum et epistolarum*, etc., *libri duo* [*et*] *Epistola de rebus Indicis a quodam Societatis Jesu presbytero*, etc.:" Venetiis, 1569. The *Epistola* begins at fol. 44.[1]

Let us pause to draw breath, wondering the while, where in the world the erudite Doctor ever discovered his little book of Julius Gabriel Eugubinus, which has enabled him now to unearth the Council of Trent and betray that assembly to mankind?

Alas, poor Doctor! We could take him into the Vatican Archives and show him, not a little second-hand book, but 140 great folio tomes of speeches and acts of the Council of Trent. We would undertake to show him, not one speech of Julius Gabriel Eugubinus, but a hundred and fifty speeches by many others besides Eugubinus, wherein there is not a word about St. Francis Xavier. We could show him letters, another "multitude," and all of them original, not printed in a second-hand book, in which there is never a word about the miracles of St. Francis Xavier. We could exhibit letters from Bishops and Cardinals—all with the same sad qualification. One thing we could not show him—we humbly confess it—we could not show him letters, neither a "multitude" of them, nor even one, "written by the Pope himself from the Council." That passes our powers. We think it would transcend the abilities even of the Bollandists and of all the students together in the Vatican archives. It will take an ex-professor of history at Cornell University to dive so deep into history, and to become such a man of mark, as to find

1 P. 13, 14.

letters written from the Council of Trent by a Pope who was never there! The erudite world has not the equal of Dr. Andrew Dickson White in legendary lore. There he is without a peer.

But, seriously, is that all he knows about the Council? Then, if he did find his little second-hand volume, what about the translation, the grammar, the parsing? Has he done with Julius Gabriel's Latin what he did with Joseph Acosta's? And has he treated the Latin translation of the letter, written by a Jesuit Father, away "in a field very distant from that in which Xavier labored," with the same accuracy, fidelity and scrupulous regard for truth, with which he signalized his performance on the other Jesuit writing in Peru, 12,000 miles away from the East Indies?

Considerations like these, and others of a graver order still, however much beneath the notice of the ex-professor of history and the present Ambassador to Germany, have acquired such a control over more ordinary minds, that we fear a mutual understanding is hopeless on the present question. Our ordinary minds are not yet prepared, any more than a certain judge was, to admit as juridical evidence the plea of that spirited criminal who, when pressed too hard by eye-witnesses, professed and propounded to the court, as Dr. White is now doing to us, that "for every one of the witnesses they could bring to testify that they had seen him commit the crime, he could bring ten to testify that they had not seen him commit it." We are not yet prepared for this manner of demonstration. Dr. White is too spirited for us. So we must concede to the Doctor without reserve all the glories and emoluments of his little second-hand volume on Julius Gabriel Eugubinus.

§3.

But he shrieks, and twelve times does the shriek rend the air: "No account of a miracle wrought by him appears either in his own letters or in any contemporary document." And he turns upon us in a monitory note, full of severity: "This statement was denied with much explosive emphasis

by a writer in the *Catholic World* for September and October 1891, but he brought no *fact* to support this denial. I may perhaps be allowed to remind the reverend writer that since the days of Pascal, whose eminence in the Church he will hardly dispute, the bare assertion of even a Jesuit Father against established facts needs some support other than mere scurrility."[1]

We feel humbled and intimidated. Not only Dr. White and Alfred Maury, but Pascal is now upon our hands. We must try to excuse ourselves.

Will then our "bare assertion" be humbly allowed to stand, if we adduce in support of it the testimony of Dr. A. D. White? He supports it for us by giving us first three contemporary facts; then nine; then the whole series of Barreto's contemporary facts, reduced into verbal processes for service at Rome; then the series of "ten great miracles,"[2] selected by Cardinal Del Monte from a great number juridically examined over again, and all taken from the sworn depositions of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses contemporary with Xavier. Will this support from Dr. White satisfy Dr. White? Or will he discard even that? We had indeed adduced a long page and a half of eye and ear testimonies to Xavier's gift of tongues, all taken from the official document, called *Relatio super Sanctitate et Miraculis Francisci Xaveri.*[3] But we do not pretend to defend ourselves, except where Dr. White supports us; the more so, as our tastes differ so much from his in many respects. For instance, he makes merry over the "pious crab,"[4] which brought back to Xavier the crucifix lost overboard. Now we, on the contrary, would almost speak reverentially of a "pious crab," in comparison with an impious man; we should prefer any day to have a crab's "piety" rather than a human being's impiety. For of the impious man it has been said: "It had been better for him he had never been born;" and that has never been said of a crab, still less of a "pious" one.

1 Ibid. p. 6.

2 Ibid. p. 14.

3 *Cath. World*, Oct. 1891, pp. 30–2.

4 P. 20 text and p. 21. note.

And does the Doctor now fly to Pascal for protection against the consequence of his own revelations? He should not have made them. He should have kept to his originals, to Dr. Douglas and the vicar of Templebodane, and all the rest of them—he ought to have prevaricated, he ought to have done so stoutly, and clung to his prevarication stubbornly. Then he could have stood alone, as Pascal has stood, since he perpetrated his feats in that line two centuries ago.

And what is this "Church," in which Pascal is so eminent? We did not know the Doctor had any Church. He told us so in his Introduction, that he had risen against all Churches and against all "sweet reasonableness." We had taken him to be a Voltairian of the latest generation, that is, evolved through Darwinism. We had our reasons for this. Finding that he blasphemed in every chapter, that he ridiculed the Bible from Genesis to the Apocalypse, that he dragged the name of "the Lord Jesus Christ," as Renan, as Strauss, drag that sacred Name in the mire, we had reasons for putting him down as a Voltairian of this latest generation, which, having neither faith nor science nor literature any more, recognizes no other principle than that of making money, and making books to make the money with.

This gentleman should not charge us with "deliberate misrepresentation."[1] No, he does not charge us with it; he says he will not; for he is too much of a gentleman. So are we. We will not charge him with deliberate misrepresentation. We consider that his word always carries with it voucher enough for the sincerity, fidelity and truth which distinguish him. We only say that, to establish his libellous accounts of St. Francis Xavier and of the Church of Rome generally, he ought to have made deliberate misrepresentations, he ought to have stuck to them stoutly, and then he would have needed no Pascal to support his sinking spirits. But he will call this again "scurrilous." We cannot help that. We do not stand sponsors for anything that the Doctor says; nor for any name he gives to any creature in heaven or on earth;

1 P. 17, note.

nor for his long drawn-out blasphemy against the Creator of heaven and earth.

But, as the author of the *Warfare of Science with Theology* takes things quite pleasantly and lightly, our readers, too, will take a pleased interest in learning, by what possible process he has ever managed to build up a legend on the shifting sand he has chosen, where, if he finds a solid footing at all, he must needs cede it to the cause he has undertaken to demolish.

It is a very simple and easy process. It is that of infallible assurance. He makes eleven or more declarations—we might say in his own apt terms, he makes them "with explosive emphasis"—that Xavier says nothing, that Xavier's associates say nothing, that Xavier's contemporaries say nothing, etc. Why Xavier himself, being a Saint, should say nothing about his miracles and gifts, we thought an easy matter of explanation, when we wrote six years ago; and the learned Bollandist says a word upon that subject in his recent article.[1] But, as to the associates, whom the Doctor harps on so much, he should have told us who they were. How many of them travelled with the Saint on his solitary and lonely journeys from one part of India to another, from India to Japan, from Japan back towards India? We are not aware that any troop of associates waited on the Saint. History is not aware of it either. We find that the few scattered Jesuit missionaries, oftentimes as lonely as the Saint himself, are quite reserved in communicating the first news they receive of the wonderful deeds reported.

Cries the Doctor: His fellow-missionaries never say a word! If they did not, what has that to do with "established facts?" But they do; and the Rev. Bollandist gives quite a series of them.[2]

But, says the Doctor, the great "typical collection" of letters, given by Emanuel Acosta, contains no account of miracles: "The letters in it were written by Xavier and his

1 Analecta Bollandiana, tom xvi., pp. 57-8.

2 Anal. Boll., as above, pp. 58-60.

associates not only from Goa, which was the focus of all missionary effort and the centre of all knowledge regarding their work in the East, but from all other important points in the great field. The first of them were written during the Saint's lifetime, but, though filled with every sort of detail regarding missionary life and work, they say nothing regarding any miracle of Xavier."[1] We are prone to imagine that the Doctor found this collection alone, as representative of all other collections, and magnified it duly; just as he found Julius Gabriel Eugubinus alone as representative of the Council of Trent, and amplified him accordingly. He pretends indeed to know something of other collections; for he adds: "The same is true of various other collections published during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." This is like his knowledge of the correspondence issuing from the Council of Trent, and of the "Pope writing from the Council." We leave him here in the hands of the learned Bollandist, who shows him where he might have made a fuller selection.

All that we remark on is the fidelity of the gentleman, who, telling his readers that "the first of these [letters in Emanuel Acosta's collection] were written during the Saint's lifetime," does not tell them how many there are in Acosta to answer this description. One would think there was a legion of them. Out of forty, there are just five, besides two from St. Francis Xavier himself. He says: they are "filled with every sort of detail regarding missionary life and work."

Let us just see. Two of the five are from Paul the Japanese, in one of which he gives an account of his own life and conversion to the faith; and in the other, which, as it stands in Acosta, is an extremely short note, he speaks about the conversion of his family. Two are from Cosmas Torres; the first about his own vocation to the Society, the other about the missionary labors in Japan, whither he had gone with St. Francis Xavier. Finally, there is one from

[1] P 8.

Juan Fernandez, written again from Japan to St. Francis Xavier himself! That is all ; and this is the "typical collection," which, by what it does not contain, is to gainsay what other collections do contain.

Emanuel Acosta himself did not give it forth as a "typical" collection, if by "typical" the Doctor means complete. He made a selection, not only of letters, but of parts of letters, for fear his book should be too large ; and he reduced all the substance of the entire Indian correspondence into a preparatory commentary, where everything might be found, without the desultoriness of epistolary style. The Doctor seems to have seen something inconvenient, with regard to miracles, in this commentary of Emanuel Acosta ; for he refers very lightly to it at the end of his legend, saying: "commentaries written as an afterthought nearly twenty years after Xavier's death."[1] This was quite an afterthought of the Doctor's, at the end of his legend. We would recommend to an historian like him the little effort of forethought, which would consist in reading the very first pages of the book he is consulting. There on the reverse of folio 5, he could have read, in the dedicatory espistle of the Latin translator, addressing Cardinal Truchses: "It seems to me that Emanuel, whose work we translate, was both prudent and faithful in retrenching what seemed not so necessary, and then condensing all the rest into a brief commentary, to put in readiness and at hand, whatever seemed most worthy of written record, for such as desired to be informed of the state and progress of Indian affairs, under the aspect of religion." And the translator says, that he too has retrenched further, without prejudice to the substance.[2] The translator addresses the Cardinal from Rome, 15 Kalen. Decembris MDLXX. This is the identical edition which our author has consulted

1 P. 17.

2 Rerum a Societate Jesu in Oriente gestarum, ad annum usque a Deipara Virgine MDLXVIII., commentarius Emanuelis Acostae Lusitani, recognitus et latinitate donatus : accessere de Japonicis rebus epistolarum libri iiii., item recogniti, et in latinum ex Hispanico sermone conversi. Dilingae, apud Sebaldum Mayer, anno MDLXXI.

in the Royal Library at Munich.[1] But the hurry he must have been in while consulting it in a foreign library was like the hurry he must have been in when writing his ill-digested chapters on ocean steamers or on the Nile. And other considerations must have made him anxious to shut the commentary up in the most expeditious manner possible.

For, on folio 4, is the letter of John III. to the viceroy, enjoining on him the citation of competent witnesses,[2] the drawing up of authentic verbal processes from the depositions,[3] and moreover the entering of the whole process itself into the public records.[4] The witnesses are to be cited from all the regions where there are any persons thoroughly conversant with the facts,[5] and they are to reply to the interrogations under oath.[6] After giving the letter, Acosta goes on to say: "On the arrival of the King's letter in India, the ministers executed the orders with care, and sent to the King such an amount of information, exactly sifted and certified, that it would take too long for us to rehearse all here."[7] Nevertheless to a series of miracles and prophecies he devotes folios 8 to 12.

It is just in the same way that Cardinal Del Monte, in the Papal Consistory of January 19, 1622, introduces the miracles thus: "Out of many miracles which are contained in the processes, and were wrought during life and after death by the Servant of God, Xavier, we have selected these few." And he gives ten of those wrought during life, and thirteen after death; the first of these latter is Xavier's body remaining incorrupt after death, of which we shall hear more anon. Then the Cardinal goes on to "Miraculous Predictions,"

1 P. 11, note.

2 Idonei testes.

3 Tabulas publicas seu authentica instrumenta.

4 Ipsamet iniquisitio in publica monimenta recte atque ordine referatur.

5 Omnibus istis in regionibus, quicunque earum rerum probe conscii extiterint.

6 Jurati ad interrogata respondeant.

7 Fol. 4 verso: ita multa probe comperta atque explorata miserunt, ut singula hoc loco persequi nimis longum sit.

saying: "Of the miraculous predictions of this Servant of God, we shall report some of the more principal ones;" and he recounts seven.[1] And, before he comes to these selections, he puts on record, in the true style of that canonical jurisprudence in which was cradled the civil jurisprudence of Christendom, the series of official processes, now issuing in this summary Relation. The steps were these:

Sixty years after Xavier's death, "when the fame of his sanctity and miracles was in the mouth of the whole Christain world," Paul V., yielding to the supplication of the Society of Jesus, commissioned the Cardinals of the Congregation of Rites to take cognizance of and examine[2] the original processes, drawn up by the Ordinary of the Indies, of Goa, of Cochin, of Bazain and Malaca, at the instance of John, King of Portugal; and determine the preliminary question, whether the fame of Xavier's sanctity and miracles, and the devotion of peoples to him, was such as to warrant further steps. First, Cardinal Pamfili, then after his death, Cardinal Lancelot, presided over this preliminary investigation, conducted by three Auditors of the Rota, whom Del Monte names, and two notaries, one succeeding on the death of the other. The articles regarding the alleged fame of Xavier were produced by a legitimate procurator. Twelve witnesses were examined on this general question of Xavier's fame for sanctity and miracles, *cum interrogatoriis et servatis aliis de jure servandis.* The original processes were produced; they were faithfully interpreted; they were acknowledged to be in form. Finally, the Sacred Congregation of Rites, on the report of Cardinal Lancelot, decided the preliminary and general question in the affirmative, and that now an examination could be instituted on the particulars. Wherefore, Paul V. issued another rescript, commissioning the same three Auditors to resume the cause, examine all the acts and processes;

1 Relatio facta in Consistorio secreto, coram S. D. N. Gregorio Papa XV., A Francisco Maria, etc. S. R. E. Card. A. Monte, die xix Januarii, MDCXXII., super vita, sanctitate, actis canonizationis, et miraculis, B. Francisci Xavier, Societatis Jesu. Insulis, MDCXXII. Pages 32–60

2 Super recognitione processuum . . . inquirerent et referrent

despatch official and authoritative letters,[1] as had been done in the former stage, to the Archbishop of Goa, to the Bishops of Pampeluna, Bayonne, to the Bishop of Cochin, to the Bishop of Malacca, or their respective Vicars. Meanwhile, the case was begun over again at Rome, in the particular or special investigation; and other witnesses were cited and examined according to legal forms. The report came back from the authorities commissioned at a distance, and were faithfully interpreted, were produced and examined. Then, at the instance of the procurator of the Society of Jesus, speaking in the name of the King of Spain, and of many other Princes, and of the whole clergy of India, the cause was advanced to a new stage. Many assemblies of the Sacred Congregation of Rites were held; and, taking up point after point in the premises and all the processes, the three Auditors declared that everything therein was legitimate and legal, that the witnesses for the depositions had been duly and rightly examined, and that the evidence stood, *esse in forma probanti;* and that all the virtues and actions of Xavier had been investigated in all particulars, *per particularia dubia.* And a report thereof was made to the same Paul V. This report his successsor, Gregory XV., returned to the Congregation, which then in many sessions "diligently and accurately discussed the assertions and conclusions of the Auditors, and unanimously decided: That all the aforesaid processes were authentic and valid; as they also decided: That all the proofs contained in those processes, regarding the sanctity, excellence of faith and striking miracles[2] of the Servant of God Francis Xavier, were legitimate and sufficient. Now if Your Holiness judges them to be so, and to suffice for canonization, I will proceed to what remains to be said in the third place, giving a brief sketch of his miracles in particular."[3]

In all these canonical processes, special notice is to be taken of one person and his functions. That is the *promotor*

1 Litteras remissoriales et compulsoriales.

2 Praeclaris miraculis. 3 Card. Del Monte, above, pp. 28–32.

fidei, popularly called the "devil's advocate," who allows no jot or tittle to pass without challenge. The achievements of this individual are famous. He does with causes what grand inquisitors did with heresies. Probably all great men of the courts who have mounted to the Cardinalate and to the Papal Throne have signalized their abilities here. Benedict XIV., himself *promotor fidei* at one time, gives instances of their exceptions in his well-known treatise on Heroic Virtue; and we cited an example from him when we wrote before,[1] of an exception taken by Picenino to the proof of St. Francis Xavier's Gift of Tongues, which, as Benedict XIV. added, "Cardinal Gotti vigorously refuted," and conclusively. Whether for the performances of the "devil's advocate," or for the verbal processes of the testimonies, we could alike refer Dr. A. D. White or any one else to the printed volumes which are to be found at large libraries, especially throughout Europe. We have under our own eyes now some five hundred such volumes.[2]

Dr. White seems to have had this Relation of Cardinal Del Monte in his hands.[3] His purpose in quoting the Cardinal's list of ten miracles would appear to be chiefly for the sake of making merry at the expense of the "pious" crab. The rest he was in too great a hurry to see. Possibly he was writing "in a boat on the Nile"[4] at the time. He consulted Emanuel Acosta in the library at Munich. He was in a very great hurry. He slammed the book, and ran away from the library with the identical notion which he had carried into the library with him; and then he went and wrote "on an Atlantic steamer."[5] It is a pity his readers, too, are not on an Atlantic steamer, or in a boat on the Nile!

§ 5.

We ought now to follow the Doctor through the imaginative construction of his legend, growing from Maffei to Tur-

1 *Cath. World*, Oct. 1891, p. 28.

2 In the library of the Bollandists.

3 P. 21, note.

4 Dr. White's Introduction.

5 Ibid.

sellini, to the "life of Vitelleschi," to Bouhours. But, as all the imaginative foundation of the legend has disappeared, it could afford us nothing but amusement. Our instincts put restraints upon us here; and our space puts still more. We quoted Maffei textually, and we quoted Tursellini textually, showing that they themselves contradicted the Doctor's gratuitous assumptions in their regard. But they were necessary for his legend. So we find them in his book with the same libels pinned to them which the Doctor's ingenuity had devised for them in his article. We told him there was no Life of Xavier written by Vitelleschi. He changed his text accordingly; but appended thereto a comic interlude, if not rather something tragic, which perhaps merits a word here.

In the former edition, he had spoken of the Life written in 1622, "by Father Vitelleschi;"[1] he had said again: "Vitelleschi, in his Life of Xavier."[2] Now Fr. Vitelleschi could have written no life in 1622. He had been General of the Society during seven years already; and a General can find no leisure for writing Lives. We said to the Doctor: "Who is Vitelleschi, that wrote a Life of St. Francis Xavier? There is no such person and no such Life."[3] Hereupon, in his new edition, the Doctor has done something which we do not altogether like. In each of the two places, he slips quite a different phrase into the text, saying of the Life, that it was "published under the sanction of Vitelleschi."[4] Now we have no objection to that; for it was to put the gentleman on the right path that we vouchsafed our friendly criticism. But the note, which the gentleman adds here—that is what jars on our critical sense. He says: "The writer in the *Catholic World*, already mentioned, rather rashly asserts that there is no such Life of Xavier as that I have above quoted;" and then he expands at some length. Now really we had never made any such rash assertion; for the gentle-

1 *Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1891, 6 p. 2 Ibid. p. 7.

3 *Cath. World*, Sept. 1891, p. 845.

4 White's *Warfare*, etc., ibid. p. 15.

man had never made any such quotation. We could not deny what he had not yet written. We denied only what he himself has now denied, by introducing so quietly that agreeable change into his text. He is free to introduce changes into his production. We would exhort him to put in many more. He may even do so surreptitiously. We have no objection to all that. The only open question between the Doctor and mankind generally is upon the propriety of basing an attack upon a surreptitious and masked manœuvre of self-justification. As to the rest of his expansive note, that we "have evidently glanced over the bibliographies of Carayon and De Backer, and not finding it there under the name of Vitelleschi have spared ourselves further trouble," by which remark the Doctor retorts our own argument against his whole manner of composition; to this our only rejoinder is, that there is no need of resorting to Dr. White's methods, in order to answer Dr. White. Since he now favors us, in his new edition, with the full title of this "Life of Fr. Vitelleschi," we recognize it as the sketch by Fr. Soprani. There is such a book. And, if as good use be made of it in future, as we augur for Joseph Acosta in the library of Cornell University, we may congratulate ourselves on the very best results.

He takes up Bouhours, who wrote 130 years after St. Francis Xavier's death; and he devotes about three pages to the "evolution of legend" in Fr. Bouhour's popular Life. It is to be regretted that the Doctor does not find a biography of the Saint written in the year 1897. We believe it would have added a complete stage to his edifice. Having at hand to-day the huge mass of processes, which were already available in Bouhour's time; possessing besides the immense literature on the Saint now at the world's disposal; a modern writer could strike out on a line of his own, make new detours through all that material; he could with literary art adjust new combinations in assorting it, and make special features salient by the situations he selected in it; and he could do all this, with such effect, well known indeed in the literary world of biography, that the same ignorant passer-by, who had thought before that no new life could be written

effectively of a great personage, would cry out afterwards: This is all so new, it must be legend! Who knows but a biographer may yet supply the Doctor with a new stage to his edifice?

Let us give an example, and close with it, of this "wavering" line, as the Doctor speaks, or this "growing" plant, as the Doctor terms it, or this "evolution" to which he is so devoted.

Telling how the story of the resurrections wrought by Xavier had grown and wavered, betwixt one author and another, he had said in his first edition: "In 1622, at the canonization proceedings, three were mentioned; but by the time of Father Bouhours there were twenty-five."[1] Whereupon we remarked: "Charming! As if the twenty-five had evolved out of the three! In 1715 (that is, nearly a hundred years later still), the number was not twenty-five but twenty-seven, recognized, says D'Aurignac, by the court of Rome at that date; but of the twenty-seven 'fourteen had been wrought within a few years' previous to this date of 1715." D'Aurignac continues: At the same date, 1715, 'the Bishop of Malacca had authenticated eight hundred miracles in his diocese alone.' "Our legendary evolution," we continued, "imagines that all had developed out of an original small stock, an original suggestion, so to say, of protoplasmic legend."[2] It was thus we replied to the Doctor. In the new edition, the gentleman drops down rather seriously from his original "twenty-five" to "fourteen!"—as we might express our selves in Miltonian phrase, "plumb down he drops!" He says: "In 1622, at the canonization proceedings, three were mentioned; but by the time of Father Bouhours there were fourteen—all raised from the dead during his lifetime—and the name, place, and circumstances are given with much detail in each case."[3] We should have thought that pretty good. Not so the Doctor, who thinks it very bad to be in a quandary. So he issues

1 *Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1891, p. 8.

2 *Cath. World*, Sept., 844.

3 White's *Warfare*, etc., p. 17.

out of it by means of a monitory note to us. Whenever Dr. White is in brankruptcy he issues monitory notes. He says: "The writer in the *Catholic World*, already referred to, has based an attack here upon a misconception—I will not call it a deliberate misrepresentation—of his own by stating that these resurrections occurred after Xavier's death, and were due to his intercession or the use of his relics. This statement of the Jesuit father is utterly without foundation, as a simple reference to Bouhours will show." Then he flourishes a long list of Bouhours' pages in our face.

We understand the Doctor perfectly. We should like him indeed to be scrupulous about the truth; but, with the three passages now before the reader, we think it unnecessary to formulate our own impressions on that estimable and delicate virtue. All that we say now is, that, if he will just add the fourteen which he has discovered so minutely in Bouhours, to the fourteen which D'Aurignac supplied, he will arrive at twenty-eight, pretty near D'Aurignac's number, and sufficiently different from Dr. White's original twenty-five to recommend its insertion in the third edition of his valuable legend. It will introduce another "wavering" line of beauty into the varied imagery which already adorns it. As to the arithmetic involved, we have nothing to do with it. D'Aurignac will supply the figures; but Dr. White is the expert there: first, twenty-five; now, fourteen; probably, twenty-eight to-morrow.

There was once a poetic fiend whom a poetic genius described thus:

> As in a cloudy chair, ascending rides
> Audacious; but, that seat soon failing, meets
> A vast vacuity: all unawares,
> Fluttering his pennons vain, plumb down he drops
> Ten thousand fathom deep, and to this hour
> Down had been falling, had not . . .

The rest of the quotation we shall see in sober prose, when the Evolution so far considered, and the Devolution which followed, shall enter into its third edition. In the mean-

time, we shall assist the Doctor in his perilous career with some directive principles of criticism. Of them in our next.[1]

THOMAS HUGHES, S. J.

Brussels, Belgium.

1 To help the Doctor in his arithmetical development, we beg to supply him with some new figures, though at the cost of introducing him to a new book, with unknown risks to ourselves. The advocate who spoke in the public consistory before the Pope, nine days after Cardinal Del Monte's oration in the secret consistory, expressed himself thus: "Now the miracles wrought by him [Xavier], both during life and after death, were so numerous, so varied and so brilliant, that Xavier may certainly be said not to have fallen short even of the great Apostles themselves. To pass over other categories, the dead who were brought back to life, number in the Acts not fewer than twenty, although in the Relation produced before Your Holiness only four of them are mentioned," etc. Jam vero miracula per illum tum viventem, tum vita functum, patrata divinitus, tam multa, tam varia, tamque insignia sunt, ut profecto Xaverius nihil fecisse minus a magnis Apostolis affirmari possit. Certe mortui ad vitam restituti, ut caetera taceam, quamvis in relatione habita coram Sanctitate Vestra quatuor tantummodo numerentur, tamen non pauciores quam viginti in Actis proferuntur," etc. Oratio Nicolai Lambeccari Consistorialis aulae advocati, etc., etc., coram SSmo. D. N. Gregorio XV. in publico Consistorio etc., die xxvii. Januarii, MDCXXII: Romae, Barthol. Zanetti, etc. MDCXXII. In 4to., pp. 1–22: page 18.

ANALECTA.

LITTERAE APOSTOLICAE

De Privilegiis Americae Latinae.

LEO PP. XIII.

AD FVTVRAM REI MEMORIAM.

Trans Oceanum Atlanticum ad alteram orbis partem divinae providentiae benigna dispositione per Christophorum Columbum aperto itinere, Ecclesia Dei multa ibi mortalium millia reperit, quos, ut suum munus atque opus erat, a latebris et fero cultu ad humanitatem et mansuetudinem traduceret, ab errore et superstitione ad communionem bonorum omnium, quae per Iesum Christum parta sunt, ab interitu ad vitam revocaret. Quod quidem salutare munus, ipso vivente adhuc repertore Columbo, ab Alexandro VI. Pontifice Maximo decessore Nostro inchoatum perpetuo caritatis tenore ita Ecclesia insistere perrexit, pergit, ut temporibus nostris ad extremam usque Patagoniam sacras suas expeditiones auspicato protulerit. Campus enim spatio interminatus, cessatione ipsa atque otio ferax, si diligenter subigatur et colatur, fructus edit laetos atque uberes, cultorumque laboribus atque industriae optime respondet.

Quamobrem Romani Pontifices decessores Nostri nullo non tempore destiterunt ad Americae culturam novos operarios summittere, quos ut acrius elaborarent praestantioresque ab opere suo fructus demeterent, singularibus facultatibus et privilegiis auxerunt, atque extraordinaria auctoritate et potestate corroborarunt. Quibus freti Missionarii, lumine religionis catholicae per Americae regiones longe lateque diffuso, brevi interiecto annorum spatio, in iis praesertim locis ubi novi incolae ab Europa commigrantes, nominatim

Hispani, domicilium sibi sedemque stabilem collocaverunt, templa excitarunt, monasteria condiderunt, paroecias, scholas aperuerunt, dioeceses ex potestate Summorum Pontificum constituerunt. Ex quo factum est ut Americae magna pars ab avita religione novorum incolarum et ab origine eorum linguae haberi et dici possit America Latina.

At illud proprium est humanarum institutionum et legum, ut nihil sit in eis tam sanctum et salutare quod vel consuetudo non demutet, vel tempora non invertant, vel mores non corrumpant. Sic in Ecclesia Dei, in qua cum absoluta immutabilitate doctrinae varietas disciplinae coniungitur, non raro evenit, ut quae olim apta erant atque idonea, ea labens aetas faciat vel inepta, vel inutilia, vel etiam contraria.

Quare antiquis privilegiis temporis decursu vel ex parte abrogatis, vel alias ut plurimum insufficientibus, singulari Maximorum Pontificum largitione, aliae adiectae sunt facultates sub determinatis formulis, vel singulis Americae Latinae Episcopis deinceps delegari solitae, vel pro extraordinariis quibusdam casibus et determinatis regionibus concessae, quarum series si antiqua privilegia numero et extensione superat, difficultates tamen quae sunt circa naturam, vigorem et numerum eorumdem e medio non tollit. Ad haec amovenda incommoda decessor Noster sanctae memoriae Pius IX. datis ad id similibus litteris die 1 Octobris anni MDCCCLXVII. plura ex antiquis privilegiis pro Republica Aequatoris ad triginta annorum spatium confirmavit, seu quatenus opus fuerat denuo concessit.

Quum vero ex monumentis ecclesiasticis Americam Latinam respicientibus, quae magna peritorum diligentia collecta atque investigata sunt, probe constet multa ex privilegiis Indiae Occidentali concessis partim haud vigere, partim in dubium esse revocanda ; Nos qui Americanas gentes egregie de Ecclesia Romana meritas singulari amore prosequimur, ad tollendas in re tanti momenti perplexitates et angustias animi, quae Episcopos illarum dioecesium aliosque, quorum interest, non raro exagitant, totum dictorum privilegiorum negotium deferri iussimus speciali Congregationi Venerabilium Fratrum Nostrorum S. R. E. Cardinalium ; qui post

maturam deliberationem novorum privilegiorum catalogum, exclusis catalogis, summariis et recensionibus in conciliis provincialibus vel aliter editis, conficiendum censuerunt, confectumque Apostolica auctoritate probandum.

Nos igitur re mature perpensa, pro ea, quam gerimus de omnibus Ecclesiis sollicitudine, eorumdem Venerabilium Fratrum Nostrorum S. R. E. Cardinalium, ne Clerus et populus illarum regionum anteactorum privilegiorum memoria et usu penitus privati maneant, sententiam tenuimus et quae infra recensentur privilegia pro omnibus Americae Latinae singulisque dioecesibus et ditionibus de Apostolicae potestatis plenitudine ad proximum triginta annorum spatium hisce ipsis litteris concedimus. Quare, quod bonum, felix, faustumque sit et universae Americae Latinae Ecclesiae benevertat, mandamus, edicimus:

I. Ut electi Episcopi in Americae Latinae ditionibus commorantes postquam promotionis litteras Apostolicas acceperint, nisi aliter in praefatis litteris praescriptum sit, a quocumque maluerint catholico Antistite, gratiam et communionem Apostolicae Sedis habente, accitis et assistentibus, si alii Episcopi assistentes absque gravi incommodo reperiri nequeant, duobus vel tribus presbyteris in ecclesiastica dignitate constitutis, vel Cathedralis Ecclesiae Canonicis, consecrationis munus accipere valeant.

II. Ut Concilii Provincialis celebratio ad duodecim annos differri possit, reservato Metropolitae iure illud frequentius, prout necessitas postulaverit, celebrandi, nisi aliter per Sedem Apostolicam postea ordinatum fuerit.

III. Ut Episcopi Sacrum Chrisma, quod ex indico etiam, vero tamen balsami liquore fieri potest, et Olea Sacra conficere possint iis sacerdotibus adstantibus qui adstare potuerint, et, urgente necessitate, extra diem Coenae Domini.

IV. Ut adhiberi possint Sacra Olea etiam antiqua, non tamen ultra quatuor annos, dummodo corrupta ne sint, et peracta omni diligentia, nova vel recentioria Sacra Olea haberi nequeant.

V. Ut pro omnibus et solis regionibus seu locis, in quibus magnae distantiae causa vel ob aliud grave impedimentum

perdifficile sit Parochis vel Missionariis ad Baptismum conferendum aquam Sabbato Sancto et Pentecoste benedictam ex fontibus baptismalibus, ubi asservatur, desumere et secum circumferre, Ordinarii, nomine Sanctae huius Sedis, concedere possint Parochis et Missionariis supra dictis facultatem benedicendi aquam baptismalem ea breviori formula, qua Missionarios in Peruvia apud Indos Summus Pontifex Paulus III. uti concessit, quaeque in appendice ad rituale Romanum legitur.

VI. Ut si propter defectum temporis, improbamque defatigationem, aliisque gravibus de causis perdifficile sit omnes adhibere caeremonias pro Baptismo adultorum praescriptas, Parochi et Missionarii, de praevio Ordinarii consensu, uti possint solis ritibus, qui in Constitutione Pauli III. "Altitudo," diei 1 Iunii, MDXXXVII. designantur. Insuper ut in iisdem rerum adiunctis Ordinarii nomine Sanctae Sedis concedere valeant Parochis et Missionariis usum ordinis Baptismi parvulorum, onerata in usu huiusmodi facultatis eorumdem Ordinariorum conscientia super existentia gravis necessitatis.

VII. Ut in omnibus et singulis ditionibus Americae Latinae, nulla excepta, omnes sacerdotes tam saeculares quam regulares, quamdiu in praefatis ditionibus moram duxerint, et non alias, singulis annis die secunda Novembris seu die sequenti, iuxta rubricas Missalis Romani, qua nempe commemoratio omnium fidelium defunctorum ab Ecclesia universali recolitur, tres Missas singuli celebrare possint et valeant, ita tamen ut unam tantum eleemosynam accipiant, videlicet pro prima Missa dumtaxat, et in ea quantitate tantum, quae a Synodalibus Constitutionibus seu a loci consuetudine regulariter praefinita fuerit; fructum autem medium secundae et tertiae Missae non peculiari quidem defuncto, sed in suffragium omnium fidelium defunctorum omnino applicent, ad normam Constitutionis Benedicti XIV. Pontificis Maximi "Quod expensis" diei XXVI. Augusti, MDCCXLVIII.

VIII. Ut omnes fideles annuae Confessionis et Communionis praecepto satisfacere possint a dominica Septuagesi-

mae usque ad octavam diem solemnitatis Corporis Christi inclusive.

IX. Ut omnes fideles lucrari possint indulgentias et iubilaea, quae requirunt Confessionem, Communionem et ieiunium, dummodo servato ieiunio, si loco inhabitent, ubi impossibile prorsus vel difficile admodum sit Confessarii copiam habere, corde saltem contriti sint cum proposito firmo confitendi admissa quam primum poterunt, vel ad minus intra unum mensem.

X. Ut Indi et Nigritae intra tertium et quartum tam consanguinitatis quam affinitatis gradum matrimonia contrahere possint.

XI. Ut Indi et Nigritae quocumque anni tempore nuptiarum benedictionem accipere possint, dummodo iis temporibus, quibus ab Ecclesia prohibentur nuptiae, pompae apparatum non adhibeant.

XII. Ne Indi et Nigritae ieiunare teneantur praeterquam in feriis sextis Quadragesimae, in Sabbato Sancto, et in pervigilio Natalis D. N. I. C.

XIII. Ut praeterea Indi et Nigritae absque ullo onere, seu solutione eleemosynae uti possint indulto, quod Quadragesimale dicitur, et quo fideles respectivae dioecesis seu regionis ab Apostolica Sede donantur; ideoque carnibus, ovis et lacticiniis vesci possint omnibus diebus ab Ecclesia vetitis, exceptis quoad carnes diebus in superiori paragrapho XII. notatis.

XIV. Ut quandocumque in causis tam criminalibus, quam aliis quibuscumque forum ecclesiasticum concernentibus a sententiis pro tempore latis appellari contigerit, si prima sententia ab Episcopo lata fuerit, ad Metropolitanum, si vero prima sententia lata sit ab ipso Metropolitano, ad Ordinarium viciniorem absque alio Sedis Apostolicae rescripto appelletur: et si secunda sententia primae conformis fuerit, vim rei iudicatae obtineat, et executioni per eum, qui eam tulerit, demandetur, quacumque appellatione non obstante: si vero illae duae sive ab Ordinario et Metropolitano, sive a Metropolitano et Ordinario viciniore latae, conformes non fuerint, tunc ad alterum Metropolitanum vel Episcopum ei,

a quo primo fuit lata sententia, viciniorem eiusdem provinciae appelletur, et duas ex ipsis tribus sententias conformes, quas vim rei iudicatae habere volumus, is, qui postremo loco iudicaverit, exequatur, quacumque appellatione non obstante. Cum autem recursus ad Apostolicam Sedem etiam omisso medio, sive ante, sive post sententias iudicum inferiorum, semper integer manere debeat, ad normam iuris, in usu huius privilegii omnino servandae erunt sequentes conditiones: 1° Ut in singulis causis salva maneat cuique litiganti facultas ad hanc Apostolicam Sedem etiam post primam sententiam recurrendi; 2° Ut in singulis actibus expressa fiat Apostolicae delegationis mentio; 3° Ut causae maiores sint eidem Apostolicae Sedi reservatae ad normam Sacri Concilii Tridentini; 4° Et quoad causas matrimoniales ea custodiantur, quae in Constitutione Benedicti XIV., cuius initium "Dei miseratione," praestituta sunt.

Abrogatis deletisque Auctoritate Nostra Apostolica omnibus et singulis Indiarum Occidentalium privilegiis quocumque nomine vel forma ab hac Sancta Sede prius concessis.

Contrariis quibuscumque etiam speciali et individua mentione dignis non obstantibus.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum sub annulo Piscatoris die solemni Paschae XVIII. Aprilis, MDCCCXCVII., Pontificatus Nostri Anno Vigesimo.

A. *Card.* MACCHI.

E S. R. UNIV. INQUISITIONE.

Dubia.

DE VALIDITATE ORDINATIONIS—TACTUS INSTRUMENTORUM.

I.

Bme Pater,

Sempronius Sacerdos Regularis, ad S. V. pedes provolutus, humili prece petit solutionem dubii cuiusdam, a quo iam a plurimo tempore, circa validitatem suae ordinationis sacerdotalis, exagitatur. Quum enim in tactu instrumentorum adhibuisset non quidem indices et medios digitos, sed indices et pollices, prius tetigit cuppam calicis; sed postea, quum

Episcopus formulam pronunciavit, tetigit tantummodo patenam cum superposita hostia super calicem. Itaque, quum res non adamussim processerit iuxta praescriptiones Pontificalis, Theologorumque doctrinam, Orator pro conscientiae tranquillitate suae, petit: quid tenendum de validitate suae ordinationis?

Feria IV., 17 martii 1897.

In Congne Gen. S. R. et U. Inquisitionis habita ab Emis ac Rmis DD. Card. in Republica christiana adversus haereticam pravitatem Generalibus Inquisitoribus, proposito suprascripto dubio praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, iidem Emi ac Rmi Dni respondendum mandarunt:

Orator acquiescat.

Sequenti vero die ac feria, facta de praedictis relatione SS. D. N. D. Leoni Div. Prov. Papae XIII. in solita audientia R. P. D. Adsessori S. O. impertita, Sanctitas Sua Emorum Patrum resolutionem adprobavit.

I. Can. MANCINI *S. R. et U. I. Not.*

II.

Beatissime Pater,

Caius Sacerdos, ad S. V. pedes provolutus, humiliter petit, ut conscientiae suae tranquillitati provideatur, solutionem dubii cuiusdam a quo vexatur, circa valorem sacerdotalis ordinationis. Ex hoc profluit tale dubium, quod in traditione instrumentorum, non omnia processerunt exacte secundum praescriptiones Pontificalis, quum tetigerit tantum patenam et hostiam super calice positam, non autem ipsum calicem etsi ad istum cum digitis tangendum connisus fuisset.

Feria IV., 17 martii, 1897.

In Congne Gen. S. R. et U. Inquisitionis habita ab Emis ac Rmis DD. Cardinalibus in rebus fidei Generalibus Inquisitoribus, proposito suprascripto dubio praehabitoque Rrum DD. Consultorum voto, iidem Emi ac Rmi Dni respondendum mandarunt:

Orator acquiescat.

Sequenti vero die ac feria, facta de praedictis relatione SS. D. N. D. Leoni Div. Prov. Papae XIII. in solita audientia R. P. D. Adsessori S. O. impertita, Sanctitas Sua Emorum Patrum resolutionem adprobavit.

I. Can. MANCINI *S. R. et U. I. Not.*

III.

Beatissime Pater,

Gaspar Sacerdos ut suae conscientiae consulatur, humiliter postulat sequentis dubii solutionem. Quum Orator sacrum suscepit presbyteratus ordinem, quatuor vel quinque insimul erant ordinandi qui omnes certatim instrumenta tangere connitebantur. Meminit se prius talia tetigisse, sed quando prolata est formula, etsi conaretur illa denuo tangere, impeditus fuit a manibus caeterorum: inde timores agitationesque circa suae ordinationis validitatem.

Feria IV., 17 martii, 1897.

In Congne Gen. S. R. et U. Inquisitionis habita ab Emis ac Rmis DD. Cardinalibus in rebus fidei Generalibus Inquisitoribus, proposito suprascripto dubio, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, iidem Emi ac Rmi Dni respondendum mandarunt:

Orator acquiescat.

Sequenti vero die et feria facta de praedictis relatione SS. D. N. D. Leoni Div. Prov. Papae XIII. in solita audientia R. P. D. Adsessori S. O. impertita, Sanctitas Sua Emorum Patrum resolutionem adprobavit.

I. Can. MANCINI *S. R. et U. I. Not.*

IV.

DE USU FOECUNDATIONIS ARTIFICIALIS.

Feria IV., die 24 martii, 1897.

In Congregatione Generali S. R. et U. I. habita coram Emis ac Rmis DD. Cardinalibus contra haereticam pravitatem Generalibus Inquisitoribus, proposito dubio:

An adhiberi possit artificialis mulieris foecundatio?

Omnibus diligentissimo examine perpensis, praehabitoque DD. Consultorum voto, iidem Emi Cardinales respondendum mandarunt:

Non licere.

Feria vero VI., die 26 eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita Audientia r. p. d. Adsessori S. O. impertita, facta de suprascriptis accurata relatione SSmo D. N. D. Leoni Papae XIII., Sanctitas Sua resolutionem Emorum Patrum adprobavit et confirmavit.

I. Can. MANCINI, *S. R. et U. I. Not.*

E S. CONGREGATIONE EPISCOPORUM ET REGULARIUM.

DE JURE MONIALIUM ACCIPIENDI HAEREDITATEM.

Beatissime Pater,

Episcopus Zamorensis, in Hispania, ad pedes S. V. provolutus, humillime exponit: N. N. Sanctimonialem Ordinis Praemonstratensis in conventu civitatis N., huius dioecesis, ex Constitutionibus civilibus hispanicis ius habet ad haereditatem capiendam, quae eidem contigit ex morte fratris presbyteri recens defuncti. Hinc quaeritur:

1. An praefata Sanctimonialis, posita solemni religiosa professione quam iamdiu emisit, licite in conscientia possit gestiones agere, sive per se sive per procuratorem, ut haereditatem capiat proprio nomine coram saeculari iudice, in bonum tamen totius Communitatis, ut par est; vel potius egeat, ratione voti paupertatis, legitima dispensatione ad praedictas gestiones iuridicas agendas ad haereditatem adquirendam?

2. Dato quod dispensatione egeat: an haec eidem tribui possit a conventus Superiorissa, aut ab Episcopo cui conventus subest: vel necessario, ratione solemnis voti, a Sede Apostolica obtineri debeat?—Demum, posita necessitate recurrendi ad Apostolicam Sedem pro praedicta dispensatione, Episcopus orator suppliciter postulat:

1. Ut praefatae Sanctimoniali facultas tribuatur ad iuridicas gestiones per procuratorem instituendas ac perficiendas

pro haereditate sibi ac proprio nomine capienda, quae in bonum cedat totius Communitatis.—

2. Ut eidem Episcopo oratori sufficiens facultas elargiatur ut dispensare possit super vota paupertatis in casibus similibus ad id ut providere valeat pro urgentia quae regulariter in iisdem occurrit.—Et Deus...

Sacra Congregatio Emorum ac Rmorum S. R. E. Cardinalium negotiis et consultationbus Episcoporum et Regularium praeposita, super praemissis censuit respondendum prout respondet:

Ad 1^{m} et 2^{m} providebitur in Tertio.

Ad 3^{m} Affirmative pro petita facultate; ita tamen ut haereditas acquiratur Monasterio.

Ad 4^{m} Affirmative pro petita facultate ad triennium, pro casibus dumtaxat urgentibus, in quibus nempe non suppetat tempus recurrendi ad Sanctam Sedem.

Romae, 15 Januarii, 1897.

S. *Card.* VANNUTELLI, *Praef.*

CONFERENCES.

[NOTE.—Owing to the importance and length of the leading articles in the present number of the REVIEW, we have been obliged to curtail the space available for Conferences and Book Reviews.

THE EDITOR.]

THE FACULTY OF RECEIVING THE CONFESSIONS OF NUNS IN THE PARISH CHURCH.

Qu. Does the Ordinary who issues a summary prohibition to his clergy not to receive the confessions of religious who apply to them in their churches exceed his rights?

Resp. Confessors who have the ordinary faculty of hearing confessions, such as it is given to our missionary clergy, have a right to receive in their churches all penitents applying to them. This includes religious without distinction, as is clear from the following declaration of the Holy See made through the S. Congregation for Bishops and Regulars in answer to a proposed doubt:

"Aliquando Moniales aut ratione sanitatis aut alia causa obtinent veniam egrediendi ad breve tempus ex earum monasterio, retento habitu; quaeritur an in tali casu possint exomologesim suam facere apud confessarios approbatos pro utroque sexu *quamvis non approbatis pro monialibus?* Resp.: *Affirmative*, durante mora extra monasterium." (Die 27 Aug., 1852.)

Later (22 April, 1872), a declaration was added by the same authority, that this decision applied to all classes of religious who had made simple vows, so that they might, if need be, confess to any priest properly authorized in his own church and diocese, although not specially approved as a confessor of religious. With Regulars who have parish churches this is a *fortiori* the case since they ordinarily receive the faculty of hearing the confessions of religious through their Institute directly from the Holy See.

Qu. "Item fuit definitum pro Congregationibus Sororum quae vota simplicia emittunt nec clausurae legibus subjacent: Sorores de quibus agitur posse peragere extra piam propriam domum, sacramentalem Confessionem penes quemcumque Confessarium ab Ordinario approbatum."

Whilst it cannot be admitted that a Bishop could legitimately deprive all his clergy of the partial exercise of a faculty which is universal in its character as understood by the supreme authority of the Church, the Ordinary may, of course, reserve to himself for legitimate reasons the right of absolving in *special or reserved cases.* But a reserved case is quite a different thing from a prohibition affecting the right of the confessor as to the personality or state of life unless the latter involve the standing commission of grievous sin. It is as though a Bishop were to prohibit people from receiving absolution not by reason of any sin but because of their color of skin, or their nationality, etc.

On the other hand the Ordinary has the power to prevent the abuse of the right which every religious enjoys under the general law of the Church to select an extraordinary confessor, by prohibiting religious from habitually evading the Tridentine provision which assigns regular approved con-

fessors to each religious community. It would utterly destroy the unity of religious discipline if every member of the community were to follow the direction of a different spiritual guide. Hence the S. Congregation, interpreting the meaning of the Instruction "De Aperitione Conscientiae," answers certain pertinent doubts proposed in the following:

CIRCA CONFESSARIOS MONIALIUM

Decr. d. I. Febr. 1892 super decret. 17. Dec. 1890.

I. An qui concessus est monialibus favor recurrendi ad confessarium extraordinarium *quoties ut propriae conscientiae consulant ad id adigantur*, ita limitibus et conditionibus careat, ut ipsae eo uti queant constanter, quin unquam confessarium ordinarium adeant, et ne ab Episcopo quidem redargui aliquo modo valeant, si rationibus haud probandis aut futilibus ductae fuerint?

II. Confessarii adjuncti, si quando cognoscunt non esse probabilem causam ad ipsos recurrendi, an teneantur in conscientia ad declinandam confessionum sororum auditionem?

III. Si quaedam sorores (imo, quod pejus est, major pars illarum) constanter ad aliquem e confessariis adjunctis recurrant, debetne Episcopus silere, an potius intervenire, aliquo modo procurando ut salva sit sancita in Bulla *Pastoralis* maxima: "Generaliter statutum esse dignoscitur ut pro singulis monalium monasteriis unus dumtaxat confessarius deputetur?"

IV. Et quatenus intervenire debeat, quam inire viam legitime queat? Sacra Congregatio Emorum ac Remorum S.R.E. Cardinalium negotiis et consultationibus Episcoporum et Regularium praepositis, propositis dubiis censuit rescribendum prout rescripsit:

Ad I. Negative.

Ad II. Affirmative.

Ad III. Negative ad primam partem, affirmative ad secundam.

Ad IV. Moneat Ordinarius moniales et sorores de quibus agitur, dispositionem articuli IV. Decreti *Quemadmodum* exceptionem tantum legi communi constituere pro casibus dumtaxat verae et absolutae necessitatis, quoties ad id adigantur, firmo remanente quod a S. Concilio Tridentino et a Constitutione s. m. Benedicti XIV. incipiente *Pastoralis curae* praescriptum habetur.

I. CARD. VERGA, *Praef.*

J. M. GRANNIELLO, BARN. *Secret.*

ROMAE, I Februarii, 1892.

BOOK REVIEW.

LA FRANCE ET LE GRAND SCHISME D'OCCIDENT. Par Noël Valois. Deux tomes. Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 82 Rue Bonaparte. 1896. Pp. 406 and 516. 8 vo.

This is an important utterance on a subject to which the author has given careful study for many years, and which continually derives fresh interest as an historic study from every new attitude of the reigning dynasties towards the Holy See. Few writers have so thoroughly analyzed and understood the character of Charles V. of France, or given us a more satisfactory sketch of the condition of the Church toward the end of the year 1378, than has been done by M. Valois. To some extent he manages to vindicate France from the charge of being principally responsible for the great schism which followed upon the residence of the Popes at Avignon. He points out that Italy and Germany were incapable and unwilling to offer any real aid to the papacy, or to save its name from ignominy, whilst France politically, diplomatically, and as a military power, represented protection of the interests of the Catholic Church in the true sense of the word. The reader who follows our author through the vast field of his sources can hardly fail to be convinced that the case made out by M. Valois rests upon a strong basis. He has studied the Roman documents bearing on the subject, that is to say, those principally which pertain to the reigns of Urban VI. and Boniface IX. These were not sufficiently known even to scholars previous to the opening of the Vatican Archives. Nor is it a question simply of studying the *Registra*, recently transcribed; these have their difficulties which call upon the student to complete the *lacunae* from various other sources. The papers drawn from the archives which had been kept at Avignon, are much more numerous, and must indeed puzzle the historian who aims at treating the question from any but the most general point of view. The Bulls of Clement VII. (Robert of Geneva), known as *registres avignonnais*, because they remained there until 1784, comprise seventy volumes, form of course only a fraction of the

matter offering itself for examination on this topic, and though there is much duplicate MS. in the archives, the extent to which search must be made to distinguish copy from original is considerable. Besides the papal documents there are the declarations, memoirs, consultations, *casus*, private letters of that period published long ago by François du Chesne, Egasse du Boulay, Baluze, D'Achery, Martene, and more recently by Döllinger, Lettenhove, the abbé Gaijet and the indefatigable Jesuit Father Ehrle, all of which material, and much more, must be taken into account when we wish to treat justly even one of the leading characters of that eventful period to which Clement VII. belongs. The national libraries of France had already been ransacked for evidence which threw light upon the studies of Bréquigny, Tardif, Delisle and other French writers of national history. But our author has delved deeper into the old chronicles and found much that is new, and much that corrects wrong impressions created by such chronicles as those of the Religious of *Saint-Denys* or the allegories by Mézières and by Bonet, which passed for history under pretentious titles like *Judicium Veritatis in causa Schismatis.*

Other Italian and French sources were the state archives of Milan, not very rich in themselves, but indicating other finds which would complete the accounts of Muratori and Tartini. Naples and also the Provence, the history of which is in some respects intimately bound up with that of the Neapolitan Kingdom, furnish vouchers for the accuracy of our author's account. He goes to the archives of Spain and Portugal, of Germany and Flanders, of Brittany, Hungary, Denmark, and manages to find some unpublished documents even in England, poor as it is in accounts referring to this period.

But let the reader convince himself of the sterling qualities possessed by our author; for no student of modern history can pretend to obtain so complete a view of the whole question, as is furnished by the present work, even were we to allow its Gallican bias, which is wholly justifiable in view of the position taken by controversial historians of other nationalities.

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS. By the Rev. Louis Jouin, S.J., St. John's College, Fordham, N. Y. Pp. ix., 263.

Fr. Jouin is too well known a veteran in the field of Catholic philosophy in this country to require any word of introduction to

the readers of this REVIEW. His *Compendium Logicae et Metaphysicae* and his *Elementa Philosophiae Moralis* have long been familiar to students of philosophy, especially to those who have sat at the feet of the master in "Old Fordham." His present manual in English follows very closely the corresponding Latin compendium and has consequently the same qualities to commend it—a brevity and terseness which just hold the thought from gliding into obscurity. The essentials of philosophy are all here packed and arranged with that neatness and precision of which only those who are used to dealing in such goods have the mastery. In the hands of a teacher familiar with scholastic philosophy the work will make a serviceable class manual.

THE LIFE OF OUR LADYE, Scriptural, Traditional and Topographical. Compiled from approved sources by M. P. Benziger Bros.: N. Y.; London: Kegan Paul & Co. 1896. pp. 182. Pr. $1.25.

The neatness and simplicity with which this blue-mantled booklet has been dressed wins for it a reading, and reading, the client of Mary will find his devotion strengthen. No apology is needed for adding one more to the Lives of the Blessed Virgin, provided the addition quicken and foster love for the Mother of God. This the present little work will do. In easy strain the story is told from her birth to her Assumption. The facts are gathered from the Gospel narrative and supplemented by the teaching of the early Fathers with just enough of topographical setting to make the *compositio loci.* The devotional practices of Blessed De Montfort and an account of the Confraternity of our Lady of Light are given in the end. The make-up of the volume commends it as a gift-book.

CATENA EVANGELIORUM sacerdoti meditanti proposita.—Lovanii: J. B. Istas, typographus-editor. 1897.

P. Louis Delplace, S.J., gives us a new volume of Meditations wihch were originally designed for the use of the ecclesiastical students of the American Seminary at Louvain. The subject-matter embraces the entire life of Our Lord, arranged from the harmony of the four Gospels. The points are briefly explained within a compass of two pages for each meditation, so as to suggest matter for half an hour's fruitful consideration. A great advantage is to be found in the method adopted by our author, according to which he

confines himself to a close elucidation of the Sacred Text, following the historic order of evangelical events. Thus, the cleric obtains a fund of practical knowledge from S. Scripture, which will be of much service to him in the office of preaching. Indeed, for priests who realize the value of the Latin language as a medium of concentrated Catholic thought and feeling, which may be expanded in the familiar instructions given to the faithful, we know of no better meditation-book than this. The exegesis of the work is as sound as the method is practical, for the author has drawn from excellent sources, such as Corluy, Cornely, Knabenbauer, Hummelauer, Méchineau and others of equal eminence as interpreters of the Sacred Volume. The Jesuit Order has produced nearly all our standard works on the art of meditation, and this last one is certainly among the best.

ELEMENTA PHILOSOPHIAE SCHOLASTICAE, Pars I. Auctoribus Fratribus Scholarum Christianarum. Ex Typis N. Y. C. Protectory, Neo Eboraci. 1897. Pp. 192.

Brother Chrysostom, who modestly merges his personality in the community of the Christian Brotherhood, has written these elements of philosophy for the use of his pupils in Manhattan College, in which he has been for many years a professor. The work is in the strictest sense a text book. The essentials of Logic and Ontology are here, and we might add the quintessence of Cosmology likewise, for the latter section is exceedingly brief. The author's aim throughout has been to put these essentials in briefest shape compatible with clearness and distinctness. There is not a superfluous sentence, scarcely a word that could be spared in the book. Though thus compact the work is not jejune. To the teacher's eye familiar with the general subject matter the text will appear sufficiently full and suggestive of much more than it explicitly states.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

JAHRBÜCHER DER CHRISTLICHEN KIRCHE unter dem Kaiser Theodosius dem Grossen. Von Gerhard Rauschen. B. Herder: St. Louis, Mo. 1897. Pp. 609. Pr. $4.00.

FESTSCHRIFT ZUM ELFHUNDERTJÄHRIGEN JUBILÄUM DES DEUTSCHEN CAMPO SANTO IN ROM. Herausgegeben von Dr. Stephan Ehses. Mit zwei Tafeln und zwölf Abbildungen im Texte. The Same. 1897. Pp. 307. Pr. $4.50.

DIE CHORGESÄNGE IM BUCHE DER PSALMEN. Ihre Existenz und ihre Form, nachgewiesen von J. K. Zenner, S. J., in zwei Theilen. The Same. Pr. $3.35.

THEOLOGIA FUNDAMENTALIS. Auctore Ignatio Ottiger, S.J. Tomus I. De revelatione supernaturali Cum approbatione Revmi Vic. Cap. Friburgensis et super ordinis. The Same. 1897. Pp. 928. Pr. $4.00.

INSTITUTIONES THEOLOGICAE DE SACRAMENTIS ECCLESIAE. Auctore Joanne Bapt. Sasse, S.J. Vol. I De Sacramentis in genere. De Baptismo. De Confirmatione De SS. Eucharistia. The Same. 1897. Pp. 590. Pr. $2.90.

DER GRUNDGEDANKE DER CARTESIANISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE, aus den Quellen dargestellt Zum dreihundertjährigen Geburtsjubiläum Descartes', von Professor Dr. Otten The Same. 1897. Pp. 142. Pr. $1.15.

DIE JENSEITSHOFFNUNGEN der Griechen und Römer nach den Sepulcralinschriften. Ein Beitrag zur monumentalen Eschatologie. Von Carl Maria Kaufmann. The Same. 1897. Pp. 85. Pr. 80c.

SACRAE LITURGICAE COMPENDIUM Lectiones liturgicae in Seminario Tornacensi olim habitae ab Arm. J. Pourbaix. F. X. Coppin, Editore. Decallonne—Liagre: Tornaci. Victor Retaux: Parisiis Pp. 613. 1897.

L'HYPNOTISME FRANC, par le R. P. Marie Thomas Coconnier, O. P., Prof. de Théologie Dogmatique à l'université de Fribourg. Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre. 1897. Pp. 436.

QUESTIONS BIBLIQUE, œuvre extraite d'articles de Revues et de Documents inédits, par M. L'abbé C. Piat, Prof à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. À la même librairie. 1897. Pp 408.

HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE, et particulièrement de la philosophie contemporaine, par Élie Blanc, Chanoine Honoraire de Valence, Tome I. Depuis les origines jusqu'au XVII^e^ siècle (Pp. 656). Tome II. Philosophie du XVII^e^ et du XVIII^e^ siècle. Commencement du XIX^e^ siècle (Pp. 653). Tome III. Philosophie du XIX^e^ siècle (suite) (Pp. 656). Lyon: E. Vitte. Paris: Jules Vic et Amat 1895. Pr. 3½fr. chaque tome.

INSTITUTIONES JURIS ECCLESIASTICI tum publici tum privati, ad usum Seminariorum et in gratiam Clericorum qui Romam se conferunt ad Gradus Academicos consequendos exaratae. Auctore P. Ch. Makée, D. D. Duo vol. in 12, quorum utrumque constat 500 paginis, 7 fr. Parisiis, apud Roger et Chernoviz 1897.

THE CLAIMS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. Lectures delivered in connection with the sesquicentennial celebration of Princeton University, by Stanley Leathes, D.D., Prof. of Old Testament Exegesis in King's College, London. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1897. Pp. 73.